August 15 will mark three years since the disorderly withdrawal of Western contingents from Afghanistan, as a consequence of the Doha Agreements (February 29, 2020), which effectively handed the country over to the Koranic students (modeled after the Paris Agreements for South Vietnam in 1973), with the acceleration in the withdrawal of the last thousands of US soldiers desired by President Trump and with the wrong methods and timing imposed by President Biden.
In this way, in a hot August of 2021, twenty years after the start of the international intervention in Afghanistan, all the results achieved with difficulty (and bloodily) and the social conquests obtained, especially those relating to the role of women, girls and ethnic minorities, have been lost.
An “escape from Kabul” which, after the strong emotions aroused by the extensive media coverage, no longer arouses any interest either due to the attention paid to the Russian aggression in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East or to forgetting the dishonorable Western evacuation from that country.
Despite the obvious difficulties of containing the return of the Taliban insurgency, expectations were positive, despite President Obama’s ill-advised decision to announce in December 2009, during a speech at the West Point Military Academy, the gradual withdrawal of US troops starting in the winter of 2011.
A retreat which, with the exception of a few departments, was supposed to end by 2014, as – according to him – the objectives of the mission had been achieved (thanks to the tremendous progress US, coalition and Afghantroopshave made).
There are several causes that led to the return of the Taliban: the political class, ethnic fragmentation, drugs and corruption.Destabilizing factors closely interconnected, where corruption was the catalyst of that tragic reality.
This is associated with the Western presumption of ethnocentrism.to give priority to the values of our culture when analyzing other cultures and to believe that we know better than the locals what they need in terms of political, social and economic references.
Trying to promote democratization from the outside, ignoring the fact that democratic institutions alone are not enough to generate democracy in cultures that, whatever their merits, do not have a Western-style society, has caused the fall of trusted allies, such as the Shah of Persia or the President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, and has facilitated the establishment of hostile and even more authoritarian regimes.
The fight against drugs has never been seen as a priority and no attempt has ever been made to achieve any kind of common effort, also due to the direct involvement of some prominent government officials.
According to a traditional view of the concept of counterinsurgencywhich envisaged fighting the guerrillas militarily, the drug problem was considered secondary and a diversion of resources from fighting the insurgents, despite the experiences gained in South America in the 1970s having demonstrated to Washington the close link between guerrillas and drugs.
The level of corruption in the public and private sectors was a major threat to the success of the mission and the viability of the Afghan state. Corruption undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government, made criminals and their patronage networks increasingly stronger, fueled discontent among the population, and generated active and passive support for the insurgency.
Corruption of public officials granted drug traffickers impunity and created a widespread culture of illegality that hindered the country’s economic growth and perpetuated its dependence on international assistance.
This phenomenon was widely known within the International Community and, although aware of the damage it caused, it was never decisively opposed for various reasons.
A problem also due to the “donors” (institutional, governmental and non-governmental) who have not always controlled (or wanted to control) the destination, management and use of funds and the distribution of aid (a recurring situation in such missions).
In Afghanistan, there has been a lack of a unified direction in the conduct of the intervention from the very beginning, which has not allowed the definition of theEnd State to be achieved at the end of the international commitment from which a coherent Exit Strategy and the resources necessary to conduct operations.
In twenty years four missions have taken place (International Security Assistance Force,Resolute Support Mission,EnduringFreedom,Freedom’sSentinel)with different purposes, rules of engagement, caveats and modus operandi.
A “coalition of coalitions” characterized by the lack of a shared political plan in the use of military contingents due to the prevalence of national positions (interests). At the height of international involvement, soldiers, police forces and contractors from 51 nations of the Atlantic Alliance and partner countries were present in Afghanistan.
The (excusing) accusation, moreover, of attributing the blame for the rapid Taliban victory exclusively to the lack of fighting spirit of the local security forces seems unjust; over 66,000 soldiers and police officers have fallen in the fight against the insurgents: these are not the numbers of losses of an army that is afraid to fight!
The disintegration of the TOfghanNnational Ddefense and Ssecurity Forces(ANDSF) is due to the incompetence and dishonesty of the highest levels of government institutions. Corruption, nepotism and the pursuit of personal interests have pervaded the security forces and undermined their fighting will (funds intended for fuel, ammunition, equipment and salaries were regularly diverted to corrupt officials and officers).
But the Coalition countries also have their responsibilities for the ways in which they set up, directed and conducted the reconstruction of the Afghan forces.This could happen in the presumption of having wanted to train them according to Western standards, without taking into account that to form a conventional Armed Forces it takes decades, a solid class of commanders and a firm political decision, especially when the mentality is completely different, as had already been seen for the Iraqi Armed Forces.
The activities of foreign trainers have often contributed to “unlearning” the Afghans how to fight, claiming to teach them – who are, let us not forget, the most feared warriors in Central Asia – Western operational schemes.
Now, 23 years after the attacks on the Twin Towers, Afghanistan has once again become a “safe haven” for many terrorist groups. According to periodic reports from the A AnalyticalSupport and Sanctions Monitoring Team There are approximately 20 active formations on both sides of the Durand Line, which marks the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, without forgetting the presence of ISIS-K which is trying to create the universal Caliphate of Khorasan in that region.
A reality that even led the Russian Defense Minister to affirm at the June 2024 meeting of the CSTO in Kazakhstan (Collective Security Treaty Organization) that the main source of instability in Central Asia remains Afghanistan and that numerous radical and terrorist groups are gaining ground. An even more truthful statement considering that Moscow (together with China and Iran) has established diplomatic relations with the Kabul regime.
Afghan society is becoming progressively poorer. Women have disappeared from daily life, remaining increasingly confined within the home; female education is reduced to a minimum.
Millions of Afghans, especially among the more educated classes, have fled or are trying to flee, making it increasingly difficult for Italians to govern the country and also to employ the millions of dollars they periodically receive from abroad (especially from the USA) – without which the situation would be even more dramatic – due to the lack of professionally trained employees in state offices.
This disheartening situation should raise a question in all of us: where have we gone wrong in twenty years of commitment in Afghanistan?
The answers could be countless depending on the point of view. It is certainly possible to affirm that some causes of this failure are due to our belief of presumptuous ethical-moral superiority (wanting to call democratic elections in countries that do not know and do not understand what the term democracy expresses), to having consciously supported corrupt governments and to having imposed at the head of these governments people distant from the local reality, identified by the International Community among the economic and intellectual elites of cosmopolitan education (as in Iraq and Libya) as more inclined to share Western models (an elite is not representative of society, especially when it has lived abroad for years).
Furthermore, they relied on the operational superiority of the Western military approach and the most advanced weapons systems to achieve decisive success, which were instead neutralized in the rocky deserts and rugged mountains of the Hindu Kush by indomitable guerrillas.
But above all, failing to understand the daily needs of those populations that have become the “confrontation ground” for the interventions!
