Quick, precise, safe. Certainly more expensive than drones, but effective. For this reason used before every air attack or invasion in the last thirty years. And Kiev could get them
The war between Russia and Ukraine brought back to Europe a type of conflict that seemed destined for oblivion. The classic one made up of trenches, artillery and tanks. In the last two years, remotely piloted aircraft (drones) and artillery have been considered the most effective tools, but today Ukrainian President Zelensky is asking Washington for Tomahawk missiles, which are of the cruise type. In both cases it is a question of being able to hit a target at a distance without even having a human being travel, thus being able to exploit three characteristics: the quantity of explosive transported, speed and precision. Three parameters which, however, do not always go hand in hand. But anyway, cruise missiles will remain the first offensive option of the great powers for years.
Standoffs, stealth and hypersonics
If we look at a different scenario, where the geographical distances between the belligerents are greater and there is no front line, such as the recent war between Iran and Israel (June 2025), we have witnessed the massive use of low observability radar (Stealth) aircraft and ballistic missiles, always cruise missiles, with very strong research by the USA, Russia, China, North Korea and other nations to build hypersonic and increasingly lethal ones. Whatever the war scenario, the weapon that cannot be done without is therefore the cruise missile. These are the reasons: it strikes at long distances, precisely, it does not have a crew on board and it does not require the deployment of launchers because in the majority of cases they launch from ships, submarines or airplanes.
Drones, artillery and field adaptations
In February 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was stopped by artillery, heavy infantry weapons, and widespread use of small, single-soldier portable missiles (typically Manpad Javelins). But with the continuation of the war and the scarcity of expensive weapons, armed drones were developed, copying what the ISIS militiamen had already done in 2010. Looking instead at Israel’s air campaign against the Islamic Republic, rapid precision attacks were carried out at the beginning of the conflict, exploiting the fact that Iran does not possess an air component capable of stopping the stealth F-35s, and these were flying over enemy territory without encountering obstacles. Night and day, Israel struck Iranian military targets, crippling Iran’s ability to wage war.
Advanced defenses and limits of missile warfare
The missile clash was, however, less “unequal”, with Israel and its allies using advanced systems to counter the formidable (also because they were cheap and quickly produced) Iranian ballistic missiles. The conflict then quickly ended after American B-2 stealth bombers damaged important Iranian nuclear sites, while there was a dense campaign to neutralize the arsenals in which the Iranians and Yemenis kept missiles and drones. But in this case, there were pilots on those airplanes who risked their lives.
The primacy of the cruise missile
Therefore, only one war capability has been fundamental in all conflicts from 1990 to today: the low-altitude cruise missile and, by extension, the attack drone. If we go back to the Gulf wars (1990-1991 and 1993-2011), we realize that the majority of US conflicts began with missile attacks conducted with low-altitude cruise effectors, in particular the famous Tomahawk missile born in the Seventies and entered into service in 1983. Although more expensive as individual objects, these paralyze the air defenses, the command and control and other critical objectives and prepare the ground for other interventions by making it less hostile, therefore safer because they lower the risk of losing men, and this largely offsets the costs of the missiles themselves.
Low altitude, precision and economical alternatives
Flying at low altitude, these precision munitions limit detection by radar and attacks by air defenses that typically require a direct line of sight to the target. Given their cost, cheaper but slower alternatives – therefore more drone-like – have played a similar role: the Israeli Harpys, Iranian Shaheds and Ukrainian FP-1s are effectively “slower but cheaper” cruise missiles that use propellers instead of turbofan jet engines. And in the Iran-Israel, Russia-Ukraine, and Azerbaijan-Armenia conflicts, low-flying attack drones have severely damaged military targets and critical infrastructure. And even the best defenses have been unable to stop this threat.
Strategic implications and submarine deterrence
Sadly we see this every day with Russia’s operations to cripple Ukraine’s power grid and Ukraine’s ability to devastate Russian oil production. It is therefore not surprising that the United States, Russia and China have invested so much money in submarine-launched cruise missiles: the additional element of surprise provided by submerged vessels makes cruise missiles a very effective conventional deterrent. Nor does Kiev want to equip it to strike Russian targets at long distances quickly and effectively.
