The alleged agreement which should pave the way for the birth of a caretaker government for the Gaza Strip is proving to be, in fact, one cleverly crafted political trap. As reported by Kan Reshet BetHamas is apparently participating actively, but covertly, in the formation of the new executive which should take control of the enclave once the plan to end the war is completed. Behind the appearance of an agreement shared and supported by Arab mediators, a maneuver designed to preserve the influence of the Islamist movement and guarantee him a future political role, even if formally hidden behind “technical” and apparently neutral figures. Israel, which should have obtained institutional pacification from this agreement, instead risks finding itself faced with a renewed and more insidious version of Hamas.
According to the report, Hamas has already appointed about half of its members of the future government. The designations would have occurred through a network of personalities who, although not openly declaring their affiliation with the movement, share its principles and ideological vision. The other half of the members, formally attributed toPalestinian National Authoritywould have been selected with the tacit consent of Hamaswho would thus have effectively obtained a right of veto on appointments. In essence, the new government would already be born with an asymmetric balancein which the influence of the Islamist group would remain intact, while the Palestinian Authority would appear as a useful façade to reassure Western sponsors and present the transition as a step towards “normalisation”.
A diplomatic illusion which masks the reality: Hamas has no intention of relinquishing power in Gaza, but of relegitimize itself through a political operation carefully disguised as an institutional compromise.
Control of Hamas terrorists
Egyptian sources and Arab mediators have confirmed that the full list of members of the future government has been previously shown to Hamas. The goal was clear: to get his green light and assure him that the executive would not threaten his fundamental interests. In other words, the birth of the new government would be conditioned by the approval of the terrorist movementwhich thus maintains a direct and continuous power of influence on the entire political process.
For Israel, all this takes on the contours of a diplomatic “poisoned meatball”.. Accepting a government that is formally technical but substantially infiltrated by Hamas would mean de facto recognize the political survival of the organization after a war that cost thousands of lives and aimed precisely at eliminating its control over Gaza.
An only apparent victory for Jerusalem, which would see Hamas reappear in a new guise, protected by the umbrella of international legitimacy and supported by a network of regional alliances.
Behind the language of reconstruction and “shared government” we can therefore glimpse a broader strategy: maintain power through political camouflage. Hamas, aware of the need to get back into the diplomatic game without appearing to be an obstacle to peace, has adopted a “silent co-optation” approach, influencing the future governance of the Strip from within. A refined tactic, which allows you to maintain real control while avoiding the weight of direct responsibility and visibility that would make you an immediate target. Israel thus finds itself faced with a strategic dilemma: accept a government that guarantees immediate stability but which de facto legitimizes the presence of Hamas, or reject the agreement and risk a power vacuum destined to trigger a new phase of instability. Both options present high risks, but the second could be politically unsustainable in the current international context, which pushes towards a rapid conclusion of the conflict. In this framework, the agreement does not appear as a step towards peace, but rather as a cosmetic restructuring of power in Gazacapable of reproducing the same dynamics of control and coercion that have dominated the enclave since 2007. The Palestinian National Authority, although formally reintegrated into the government, risks turning into a subordinate partner in a formula of only apparent equilibrium.
The transition towards the PNA
The international community, focused on the humanitarian urgency and the need for a stable interlocutor, could fall into the mistake of legitimize a compromise that rewards ambiguity. Hamas, once again, demonstrates its ability to use the language of politics to pursue power objectives, transforming military defeat into a tactical victory on an institutional level. If the previews of Kan Reshet Bet will find confirmation, the future government of Gaza risks being born already contaminated. And for Israel, more than a diplomatic success, it would be a question of a return to starting point: an illusory truce and an enemy more entrenched than ever. However, it is not certain that this “poisoned meatball” will have an obvious outcome. In the game of alternatives, a different and potentially decisive political possibility emerges: a transition that leads to the effective return of administrative control to Presidency of the Palestinian National Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). If the international community and mediators insisted on a model that delivers executive powers and real responsibilities to the Authority, guaranteeing security guarantees and control over the armed forces, Abu Mazen could — at least formally — regain control of the Strip.
A solution with Abbas driving would present advantages and risks. On the positive front, the reinstatement of the National Authority could break the monopoly political-military of Hamas and offer an interlocutor who, although weak and contested, enjoys greater international recognition. On the negative side, the credibility of Abu Mazen is scarce among large sections of the population of Gaza: an “imposed” transfer of power from outside would risk triggering resistance and new local conflicts, as well as placing the Authority itself in a position of political and administrative fragility.
Ultimately, the real test will be the ability of external actors to transform the simple label of “technical government” into a process of real de-militantizationand institutions: stringent conditionality on aid, independent monitoring of security forces, administrative reforms and a credible path to national reconciliation. Without these conditions, the agreement really risks giving Hamas back the political space that the war seemed to have eroded, handing Israel – not a solution – but an illusory and dangerous vision of peace.
The question that now weighs on the negotiations is therefore also this: better a fragile truce that hides the re-establishment of Hamas control, or push with determination on an alternative plan that tries to restore responsibility and control to the Authority Abu Mazen? In light of the facts that have emerged, the political response will determine whether the agreement will be remembered as the “poisoned meatball” that saved appearances, or as the missed opportunity to truly break the vicious cycle of power in Gaza.
