General Giorgio Battisti: “Urban combat is a three -dimensional and unpredictable conflict, where the enemy exploits subsoil, buildings and ambushes. To prevail, small coordinated and advanced departments are needed through buildings with the support of armored vehicles ».
The operation “Gedeone 2 wagons“Constitutes the evolution of the Israeli terrestrial campaign in the Gaza strip and responds to an eminently military logic: the elimination of the residual combat capacity of Hamas And the conquest of Gaza City as a command center, logistics and propaganda of the movement. The decision matured after the failure of the negotiations for the release of the hostages and reflects the assessment of the General Staff according to which there are no more alternative options on the plane political-diplomatic.
From an operational point of view, the plan is divided into a progressive sequence of coordinated maneuvers. The preliminary phase involves the complete insulation of Gaza City through terrestrial encirclement, with the aim of denying freedom of movement to the enemy forces and interrupt the refueling lines. The subsequent urban penetration takes place with the combined use of battleship and mechanized infantry, protected by permanent air cover. Tanks Merkava and armored vehicles Namer and Etan constitute the fulcrum of the terrestrial component, while the brigades Nahathe Givati They are in charge of the infantry operations in the urban environment. At the same time, the military genius leads underground reconnaissance activities with penetration radar, seismic sensors and robotic systems intended for the reclamation of tunnels.
The means available to Israel
The long -range fire power is ensured by artillery and aviation, which operate in synergy with intelligence to hit command centers, weapons deposits and communication nodes. The drones, both of attack and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), have a central role in the collection of information in real time and direct support to troops on the ground. The integration of electronic war skills also allows you to disturb opposing communications and to neutralize hostile drones, increasingly used by Hamas for reconnaissance and improvised attacks. The operating calendar reflects the prolonged nature of the campaign. The full mobilization of the reservists, estimated in over one hundred thousand units distributed in several waves, suggests that the IDFs intend to support constant pressure for a time span of at least a year and a half. September represents the moment of maximum concentration of the forces, but the internal planning hypothesize further phases until 2026, an indication of a structured and long -term attrition strategy. The main risks derive from the asymmetrical nature of the clash. Gaza City is a high density urban environment, with a building fabric in favor of guerrilla actions. Hamas Take advantage of micro-unit, close closer, improvised devices and portable anti-tank systems. The underground network remains the most critical factor: it allows militants to move without being detected, to carry out surprise sorties and protect sensitive infrastructures. The neutralization of this network will require considerable time and resources, with inevitable losses.
The hostages in the besieged area
A further element of complexity is represented by the presence of hostages in the areas object of the assault. This limits the indiscriminate use of bombings and forces the IDF to calibrate maneuvers, slowing down the times of advance and increasing the exposure of the units. From a doctrinal point of view, it is a difficult compromise between strategic objectives and operational constraints, which could affect the overall duration of the campaign. In strategic terms, Gedeone 2 wagons are not limited to taking an urban center, but aims to destroy the entire military and political infrastructure of Hamas. The fall of Gaza City It would mean depriving the movement of its main stronghold, spot on the ability to coordinate operations and reducing its deterrent potential. The success of the operation will measure itself not so much in immediate territorial control, as in the ability to prevent Hamas from reconstituting itself as an organized military actor. The outcome remains uncertain. The IDF has technological, logistics and numerical superiority, but has to face a hostile urban context, a rooted opponent and a hostage variable that affects every tactical choice. The risk of getting bogged down in a prolonged war, with high costs in terms of lives and resources, is real. However, for Israel the strategic evaluation is clear: after the continuous waste of Hamas to free the hostages, the continuation of the military campaign is considered not only inevitable, but the only path that remained to close the game on Gaza City.
What the IDF must expect to Gaza City
According to the General of Army Corps (Rit) Giorgio Battisti Several times the protagonist of missions abroad, “combat in inhabited centers has its own characteristics that remain similar over time, since it is the reflected product of the opportunities offered by an environment created by man for peaceful purposes but capable of transforming itself into a hostile reality difficult to dominate: a three -dimensional hell. The vertical extension constitutes the crucial aspect of operations in urban areas. It is a “multidimensional land”, consisting of the subsoil (underground, sewers, galleries), surface (road level), internal buildings, upper parts buildings and airspace, which makes the evacuation of the wounded even more difficult. Controlling the ground floor does not mean having conquered the entire building that must be conquered room per room, floor for floor up to the roof. The threat can manifest itself in various ways, by an enemy who knows the battlefield and has prepared himself for combat, with ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IED), francs shooters, launch explosive drones and raids behind the troops advanced by militiamen who use the streets of the subsoil. It is necessary to operate in teams of a few elements ready to provide mutual support and use the tanks in fire support as assault artillery. The progression must not take place through the main streets but through the buildings by opening passages with explosives or protected bulldozers to grasp the opponent on the back ».
