3,600 kilometers away from the war that has inflamed the Middle East, there is a man who could gain a lot from the new energy crisis: Vladimir Putin. Because Iran has dealt a very hard blow to the export of natural gas and oil from its drones and missiles. Persian Gulf. And supplying supplies from Russian deposits would now be convenient for many countries. In particular to the Europeans who have already, without too much fanfare, continued to purchase liquefied gas from their large and threatening neighbor.
And now, without that of the Qatarone wonders whether it is not appropriate to relax the sanctions and go back to sucking methane from the gas pipelines of the Siberia. So much for Ukraine. And to the great satisfaction of the President of the Russian Federation, who in the meantime obtained a relaxation of the oil embargo from his friend Donald Trump. As summarized by the President of the European Council Antonio Costa«so far there is only one winner in this war in Iran: Russia».
The return of Putin and the strategic blockade of Qatar
For three years Brussels told the story of a continent turning off Moscow’s taps and freeing itself from an addiction considered toxic after the invasion of Ukraine. Before the war, almost half of the gas burned inEuropean Union it arrived from Russia, channeled into gas pipelines that governments considered “reliable” and which allowed the price of wholesale methane to be kept in the range between 15 and 25 euros per MWh. After 2022, that world is over: Nord Stream was destroyed, Ukrainian transit was eliminated, new US and Qatari methane tankers took the place of Siberian pipes and the Council of the Union approved a regulation that promises to ban all imports of Russian gas by the end of 2027, both via pipeline and in the form of LNGthat is, liquefied.
Then came the Iranian drones and missiles over the Gulf. In just a few days, the attack on two strategic facilities forced QatarEnergy to stop the production of liquefied natural gas and to declare force majeure towards customers. Qatar is not just any supplier: it is one of the world’s main exporters of LNG, a pillar of what was supposed to be the “new” European energy security. The complex Ras Laffanwhich closed on March 2, was processing 75 million tonnes or 17 percent of global exports, and will take at least a month to restore its normal capacity. The wholesale price of gas on the Amsterdam TTF market it jumped in the first 10 days of March to over 60 euros per MWh (after weeks in which it fluctuated around 30-35 euros) and then ended up on the roller coaster of speculation.
The LNG paradox and the record of Russian imports
It is against this background that the old protagonist returns to the foreground: Moscow. Despite the collapse in volumes, Russian gas never completely left the European mix. Overall methane imports from Russia fell from over 150 billion cubic meters in 2021 to just over 40 billion in 2025. Of those 40 billion, part continues to arrive via pipe, through the gas pipeline TurkStream which crosses the Black Sea and Turkey to supply Hungary, Slovakia, Austria and some Balkan countries. The rest travels in the form of liquefied natural gas, shipped to the terminals of Yamal and unloaded in European ports.
It is precisely on LNG that the paradox becomes most evident. In 2024, while the embargo and “phase out” were being discussed in Brussels, the Union bought from Kremlin record quantity of liquefied gas: around 16 and a half million tonnes, more than in 2022 and 2023, in a year in which overall European LNG imports even decreased. In other words, less total LNG but more Russian LNG. And so, instead of falling, Moscow’s share of the European liquefied gas market has risen to represent around a fifth of the total.
Energy realism: the revolt of Hungary and Slovakia
What is pushing in this direction is not geopolitics, but the calculator. Russian LNG from the Yamal Arctic facilities is often offered in spot auctions at significantly lower prices than U.S. cargoes. It is difficult for European operators to give up that cost difference, especially in a context in which consumers are already stressed by the increases of recent years. The terminals of France, the Netherlands and Belgium they have turned into crucial hubs: Russian methane tankers land at Dunkirk and Zeebrugge, part of the gas is consumed in Europe, another is reloaded onto other ships and sent to Asia.
The consequence is that, while the Union announces its intention to cut energy ties with Moscow, the Kremlin continues to collect billions. A study of Greenpeace estimated that between 2022 and 2024, sales of Russian LNG to European companies provided the Russian tax authorities with over 8 billion euros in revenue. And this is without considering the residual flows via pipeline, supported by long-term contracts that in some cases extend beyond 2040.
The emergency clause and the future of Phase Out 2027
In theory, the regulation approved by the Council at the beginning of 2026 should close this parenthesis. But the war in Iran and the Qatar stop are turning this roadmap into a minefield. THE’Hungary it is the most explicit case. The prime minister Viktor Orbán has obtained a sanctions waiver from the United States that will allow it to continue importing crude oil via the Druzhba pipeline and gas via TurkStream. On the European front, the Hungarian government has challenged the phase out regulation before the Court of Justice, arguing that a total ban by 2027 would be “inapplicable”.
There Slovakia moves on a similar track. After the agreement on the total gas ban, the government led by Robert Fico declared that the country is considering an appeal against the phase out, because the more expensive alternatives would seriously damage the national economy. The war in Iran offers them a powerful argument: whether Strait of Hormuz becomes unstable, it is unrealistic to cut off flows from Russia at the same time. It is a position that many analysts are starting to define as “energy realism”.
The great nations of Western Europe, for now, are not asking for a return to Moscow’s gas. Germany, France, Italy (where however the minister Matteo Salvini insists on reopening the import of Russian gas) and Spain reiterate the phase out line. But the Middle Eastern crisis has already had an effect: the proposal to lower the G7 price cap on Russian oil has been frozen. The Norwegian Energy Minister Terje Aasland He declared that the war in Iran will “reopen the debate” on the Russian gas ban.
In the gas regulation, the Twenty-Seven have provided for a emergency clause which allows the Commission to temporarily suspend the ban on Russian imports. Until now it has remained a footnote. But with Qatar at a standstill and Hormuz unstable, that clause risks becoming the crux of next winter. If it were activated, the phase out would transform from a definitive exit project into an armed truce destined to last. Europe finds itself with a dependency stressed by the crisis in the Middle East, while taxpayers foot the bill for an unfinished energy transition and the old protagonist returns to the scene: Putin’s gas.
