Ethiopia and Eritrea are rapidly approaching open conflict. And in the meantime, the respective networks of alliances in Africa and the Middle East are moving
The Horn of Africa is increasingly at risk of sliding into war. According to the GuardianEthiopia attacked Eritrean soldiers who entered the northern part of its territory with drones. In particular, the Addis Ababa government accused Asmara of a “large-scale invasion” against itself, also speaking of a “blatant act of aggression that violates Ethiopia’s intrinsic right to self-defense”. For his part, the Eritrean Information Minister, Yemane Gebremeskel, said that his country is suffering “a war of unprovoked aggression” from Addis Ababa. In short, the situation is now incandescent. And the risk of open war is around the corner.
In recent days, Ethiopia had accused Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan of fomenting the Tigrayan rebels in the northern part of Ethiopian territory: an accusation that the three countries had flatly rejected. Not only that. A few days ago, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed Ali, returned to maintaining that Addis Ababa had the right to direct access to the Red Sea: a position that has always worried the Asmara government. In this sense, according to Eritrea, Ethiopia is preparing a war of aggression against Asmara itself to achieve the coveted access to the sea. It is in this context that, last week, Asmara and Addis Ababa severed diplomatic relations.
However, it was the end of August, when the Egyptian government warned the Ethiopians against building new dams on the Nile. Last but not least, Sudan’s top military have accused Ethiopia of backing the Rapid Support Forces: the paramilitary organization that, since 2023, has been fighting with the Sudanese army. In short, beyond the growing bilateral tension between Addis Ababa and Asmara, the crisis risks also involving Cairo and Khartoum. Without neglecting the Middle Eastern ramifications of the issue. If Egypt sides with Eritrea, Ethiopia can instead count on Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
Not only that. Abu Dhabi is also historically suspected of backing the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, while Saudi Arabia is considered closer to Khartoum’s military brass. Add to this the fact that, in all likelihood, Addis Ababa did not appreciate the fact that, a few weeks ago, the Trump administration lifted US sanctions on Eritrea. The overall picture, as can be seen, appears particularly tangled. Not to mention that a possible armed conflict in the area would end up being linked to the ongoing military tensions on the eastern coast of the Red Sea between Riyadh and the Houthis, who are in turn supported by Iran.
