>Donald Trump’s victory has led some commentators to hypothesize apocalyptic scenarios in the political relations between the United States and the Old Continent. The American president in pectore is portrayed as an enemy of Europe, ready to abandon it to itself or to split it internally, with the precise aim of weakening it. Faced with these predictions, one wonders: but are things really like this?
Let’s start with our country. Italy could gain from the foreign policy of the new Trump administration. The tycoon in fact intends to restore the logic of the Abraham Accords with the primary aim of promoting a rapprochement between Israelis and Saudis, while at the same time dusting off the policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran. Well, it is not at all excluded that the 47th president of the United States could aim to extend the Abraham Accords to the Maghreb as well: let’s not forget that, in December 2020, Morocco signed the normalization of relations with Israel. Coincidentally, in August last year, it emerged that the prime minister of the Tripoli government, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, was toying with the idea of normalizing diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. He then backtracked due to internal controversies, but in the meantime there had been an opening. Also last year, Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed blocked a bill that would have criminalized any attempt to normalize relations between Tunisia and Israel.
In short, it cannot be ruled out that, with Trump’s return, Tunis and Tripoli will reopen to this scenario, also considering the fact that the tycoon, as president, took a rather hostile line towards the Muslim Brotherhood. So the role of Giorgia Meloni’s government could turn out to be that of a mediator: a role that could perhaps be integrated into the Mattei Plan. Furthermore, it is no mystery that the current Italian executive has established significant relations with Tunisia and Libya. Furthermore, Trump could, more generally, focus on Rome as a stabilizing force for North Africa, also given his not exactly idyllic relations with Emmanuel Macron’s France. Without neglecting that the Mattei Plan intends to relaunch Western influence on the African continent also to stem the growing longa manus of Russians and Chinese in this strategic area. An aspect that will certainly be considered with interest by the new Republican administration, which aims to recover influence in Africa: especially after, during the Joe Biden years, Washington was forced to withdraw its soldiers from Niger.
On the other hand, the issue of the stabilization of North Africa and the Sahel is also functional in stemming the migratory flows directed towards our coasts. And the fight against irregular immigration could represent a further link between Europe and the second Trump administration. As president, the tycoon had words of praise for those European governments that had applied restrictions on illegal immigration, also because, especially during the electoral campaign for the 2018 mid-term elections, he used the issue in terms of internal politics. This dossier could therefore represent an opportunity to further strengthen its relations, within the European Union, with the ECR and the Patriots. Let’s not forget that, in recent months, Trump has had meetings with both the Polish president, Andrzej Duda, and the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán. Furthermore, in her entourage, there is great sympathy for Giorgia Meloni. If the axis between Trump and the European right were to consolidate, ECR and Patrioti could strengthen their political weight within the European Union, especially in the face of the progressive weakening of Macron and the German Social Democratic Party, the latter today in the midst of a very serious government crisis.
And it is here that we come to another issue: that of NATO. Those who argue that Trump would unilaterally abandon the Atlantic Alliance are making a gross error of assessment. What will almost certainly happen is that it will ask member countries to bring their economic contributions to NATO to at least 2 percent of GDP: a request which, it should be remembered, was the first to formulate by Barack Obama way back in 2014. Of course, someone remembers that, in February, Trump threatened to leave defaulting allies at Russia’s mercy. However, it also fails to say that those controversial words were uttered during a rally for the Republican primaries in South Carolina, in front of a strongly isolationist electorate. Furthermore, even if he wanted to, Trump could not abandon the Alliance without the consent of Congress.
Finally, many ignore a further point: that the new Trump administration will not look favorably on proposals aimed at creating a European army which would most likely end up under the direction of France. This is a scenario that would not be in the Italian national interest. Meloni, for her part, could instead play along with Trump to relaunch the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance: which would enormously strengthen Rome’s role in the Mediterranean and, at the same time, would help NATO itself to counteract the influence in Africa of Chinese and Russians. The question to ask at this point is: how will relations between the United States and Russia change, if they change? A certain vulgate persists in painting Trump as a “Putinian”. Yet, even in this case, the narrative is not reflected in reality. As president, Trump imposed sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, supplied Javelin missiles to Ukraine and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle. He was therefore not exactly soft on Moscow. What could happen, with his return to the White House, is that he resumes a dialogue with Russia to try to decouple it from China. It is also likely that he could try the diplomatic route on the Ukrainian conflict, but it is unlikely that he will rely on a policy of appeasement: this is an eventuality that Trump would risk paying for in the crucial quadrant of the Indo-Pacific (see further information on page 18). What the new president could, if anything, do is start negotiations after having restored the deterrence capacity of the United States, crippled by his predecessor: in other words, he could negotiate, yes, but with the proverbial gun on the table. Finally, it must be kept in mind that the frictions between the USA and Russia (also) concern the energy supply to Europe. In fact, Trump will have every interest in protecting the American states that produce and export gas (starting with Pennsylvania). It is therefore rather unlikely that, especially on this point, there will be an excess of harmony with Vladimir Putin.
As can be seen, Trump’s return to the White House does not represent the complete European debacle that is superficially predicted. Of course, dealing with him may not be easy. But evoking dark clouds on the horizon is not intellectually honest. Also because it was Biden who slammed the door in the faces of European allies during the withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. And it was also Biden who signed the Inflation Reduction Act, creating friction with the EU Commission on a commercial level. Without neglecting that the outgoing American president is leaving a legacy of a Middle East that is much more unstable than the one he found, thus creating quite a few problems for the Old Continent as well. Before we wrap our heads around crying about disaster, perhaps it would be better to look at where America has taken us in the last four years. Are we too optimistic about Trump? It might as well be. But we are certain of one thing: the new president will not be able to do worse than the Biden-Harris administration.
