That the assignment of secretary of the Soviet Communist Party touched Michail Gorbachev was not under discussion. It was the role that, in fact, already exercised when Konstantin Cerneko was still alive, on the Russian “nomenklature” number one. But the liturgy of the red synadrium involved respect for stainless rites. At the Plenum of the PCUS (11 March 1985) the interventions of the “great voters” began at 9.45 and – with a microscopic interval intended for the Corvée dei samovar With black tea – they continued for 11 hours. Each – with the emphasis of which everyone was capable – traced the ideal identikit for the new party guide but only with the last declaration was the name of the candidate pronounced which – being also the only one – not allowed the choice. Apparatchik He could suspect that the one just named would be the last secretary of the PCUS and that – worse – was destined to write the final chapter of the Soviet Union.
Gorbaciov came from the Communist School of Regime: Degree in Law and Agriculture, a member of the Politburo and convinced that he is part of that moral superiority that Moscow had always claimed. However, at the head of delegations abroad, he realized that socialism – that of Lenin and Stalin – had a short breath compared to capitalism – so hated – which had an extra gear. It was necessary to change: not to send up a political experience to which he continued to believe, but to update it to the run of time. Gorbaciov imagined small interventions on the structures that seemed to be ankylosed and some “facade” adjustments. A restyling – in the end – and not even flashy. The changes would not have concerned the substance of the doctrine. The innovations – albeit insignificant – as they are proposed by the top of the PCUS, would have had a positive impact. And, moving in advance, the risk of being obliged to accept them under external pressure would have avoided.
The first act concerned the transformation of the Federation of the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” in “Union of Sovereign States” each of which would become the owner of greater autonomies. Nothing that, to consider the legal elaboration that came out. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia and another half a dozen states – for the little that was guaranteed, compared to almost nothing that was there – accepted the reform. But, demonstrating that it was – really – of irrelevant changes: the Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) did not join the project considering it and of no guarantee. The others did not manage to choose and, in any case, they did not reply.
Even worse, the attempt to interpret one’s role of in a less formal way Apparatchik of summit. In Leningrado (May 17, 1985), concluding the assembly with the members of the Communist Citizen Committee, Gorbaciov avoided the swampy procedures of a secretary who read a couple of pages written in advance and spoke improvising. In a reasoning all projected to the future to be built, it was left with a phrase to invite you to remodel its business taking into account the needs of an evolution time. Used the term perestrojka which meant (and means) “reorganization” but, in the reports, the much wider value was attributed to this expression – and, almost revolutionary – of “reconstruction” as if it were to break down an old palace to set up a new and different nature.
Similarly (23 January 1986), meeting other managers of the PCUS, he invited not to hide the difficulties in managing public affairs. People, knowing the reason for the measures, would have accepted provisions and obligations with greater compliance. He said Glasnost To understand “transparently”, direct, without machine or misrepresentations. Also to this word they added content that went beyond Gorbachev’s intentions. Who, at that point, was “forced” to play a role that had not been chosen but that others had sewn on him.
I will, that “open” path liked to the western world. The President of the United States Ronald Reagan started with him a series of interviews destined to limit the production of nuclear weapons and decrease the potential of existing arsenals. He met John Paul II who was the head of the Church but who, for the Communists, was the “Polish” Pope, that is, the authoritative son of a land that has always been riotous in the power of Moscow. And, designing peace and brotherhood, how could Gorbaciov be able to fight in the hell of Afghanistan?
He gave him so that the troops abandoned the occupied territories and, despite the opposite opinion of the commanders, he also wanted to do it soon. The war began in 1979 (when Leonid Breznev was at the PCus secretariat) had lasted too much. On February 15, 1989, the general commander Boris Gromov crossed – on foot, alone and lastly – the bridge over the Amu Darya river which marked the border of the state of Asia. The army’s leaders considered it a defeat and they took it badly. Moreover, for the most part of the Russian oligarchy – which remained linked to models of authoritarian communism – Gorbaciorara became bulky. This alleged “new course” had humiliated the great Russia that had held the world in awe. To recover the role of the first of the class, the clock hands had to be brought back. Gorbaciov (August 19, 1991) was in Crimea to tidy up cards and thoughts, far from the palace, in view of imminent events. He was blocked in his Dacia and, for two and a half days, he seemed passed off. Golders represented almost all the nomenclature. They occupied top roles starting from the head of the secret services Vladimir Krjuckov to get to Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, the Minister of Defense Dimitrj Jazov and that of the interior Boris Pugo. Among the organizers of the conspiracy, also Valerij Boldin who was Gorbaciov’s personal secretary.
In Moscow, vice president Gennadij Janaev broke into telecommunications offices. The TV channels broadcast his declarations to justify that action of strength as necessary to counter the wicked initiatives of an inadequate party secretary.
The unified networks ad had a disruptive effect. Instead of reassuring people, alarmed it, with the result that fools more and more numerous took to the streets. And, more than manifesting in favor of Gorbaciov, they did it against the coupists. Spontaneous processions almost everywhere but, above all, in Moscow and Leningrado.
The soldiers, disobeying the orders, refused to shoot on the protesters. Indeed, an assault on the Duma, the Parliament in Moscow, planned by the KGB, was canceled when the troops deserted. A unit of tanks turned 180 degrees, placing the building, aiming the cannons to the outside. Boris Elli, who was president of Parliament, climbed the tracks of an armored. He entered the people around him, inciting them to resist the putsch and to defend that glimmer of freedom that was expected. In those days, it seemed that the winner was really Elli who, leaving the comparison as a giant, signed a series of executive decrees that put out of the communism and the flag with sickle and hammer. In Moscow and throughout Russia, the drapes with red, white and blue colors were raised.
Yet it was apparently. Because the days of the triumpters ended quickly and, just to limit themselves to the summit only, after the Elliian season the role of guide passed to Vladimir Putin who, formally, did not mention the return to communism but, in practice, found a way to apply the tools to obtain consent to the extreme. “Democracy”, “opening” and “transparency” were not canceled by the vocabulary but – there – they remained as good literary expressions for whimsical poets in the mood for lyrical constructions. Which means that the deigolpist prospects – although defeated on an individual level – found more than rapid application. The authoritarianism of which they had nostalgia returned to make hearing with arrogance. Gorbaciov’s age had already closed. n
© RESERVED REPRODUCTION
