It is above all Berlin that is pushing to incorporate the Caucasus territory into the European Union. And Moscow did not take the initiative well at all. The parliamentary elections in Georgia at the end of October present themselves as the proverbial rendezvous with destiny, both for Tbilisi and for the EU. In Georgia, two opposing and contrary trends collide. On the one hand, a large part of the population remains pro-Western and desires entry into the European Union: recent polls indicate that almost 80 percent of citizens are in favor of this entry.
On the other side, Russia really doesn’t want to hear about the EU: it fears the definitive loss of yet another piece of the post-Soviet mosaic. After the 2008 conflict, Moscow still occupies 20 percent of Georgian territory, including the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There’s more: the Kremlin shores up its hold on Georgia through political formations that are vassals of Moscow. The main one is the current governing party, Georgian Dream, which has slowed down the process of democratic reforms necessary for joining the Union by adopting openly authoritarian measures. A striking example is the proposed law that would label foreign-funded organizations as “foreign agents.”a move that has attracted strong criticism both in Georgia and abroad, and closely resembles similar measures taken by Vladimir Putin’s Russia to repress civil society and critical voices.
The opposition in Georgia is mainly represented by United national movementa pro-European party founded by Mikheil Saakashvilithe former president who led the country during the 2008 conflict with Moscow. The opposition openly criticizes the government for its closeness to its cumbersome neighbor and for the lack of transparency in the electoral process.
All this makes the next elections a real test of strength not only between Moscow and Brussels, but also between Russia and Germany, since it is above all Berlin that is pushing for the Caucasian country’s accession to the Union. The German commitment in this sense was greatly accentuated in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the beginning of 2022. In part this push responds to the need of the Berlin economy to stabilize a strategic area for its businesses, because the traditional routes of goods to and from Asia pass through there, and those of gas and oil from the Caspian Sea to Europe. In part, then, Germany now appears determined to actively counter Russian pressure in the post-Soviet space. In this attitude we read a “no” to any conciliations, which proceeds hand in hand with the consolidation of German relations in the Baltics and in Scandinavia, and configures a “Hanseatic phase”, in which Berlin focuses heavily on relations with the England and its partners in Northern Europe and on the eastern flank of the Union (read: Poland).
The conflict between the two is therefore growing and becoming hotter Germany And Russia. The latest testimony in chronological order of this trend is represented by the denunciation of an unprecedented increase in secret and sabotage activities by Berlin, launched this month by the leaders of the three German intelligence agencies – the foreign service Bnd , the internal one Bfv and the military one Mad – during the last public hearing in front of the Parliamentary Committee for the control of information services. As he reminded the agency a few days ago Reuters Hugo Dixonwho is a veteran journalist and descendant of Winston Churchill, both from the Russian and the Western point of view, the dispute over Ukraine is the revival of the traditional Anglo-American doctrine. That of Halford Mackinder or Nicholas John Spykman who foresees the “belting” of Eurasia through its periphery.
From a geopolitical point of view, the European Union-Georgia and Germany-Georgia dynamic is something new and different. Not the continental fusion between German and Russian space, that is, the embrace between the Kaiser and the Tsar that gave shivers to the English Crown, but rather a bitter clash between the Euro-German sphere of influence and that of Moscow. The latter moves its pawns on the German political scene, especially in the East, and does not disdain sabotage actions, and Berlin is pushing for Georgia to join the Union. The Merkel era, in which Putin was applauded in the Bundestag and German industry bought Russian gas at controlled prices, can therefore be said to be definitively archived.
