The Marines, on April 30, 1975, hanging on the lineup by the helicopter, already in take -off from the roof of the American embassy of Saigon, seemed to be a precipitous escape from enemies who were headed by them. And they offered the broken image of a defeat, destined to spread in the pages of history. With that photograph, in Vietnam, a war ended which, in truth, had no real beginning because it was never formally declared. In spite of a final balance that forced America to deal with 58 thousand victims and a social laceration that only the generations of the grandchildren managed, in some way, to heal. The conflict – before the clashes between uniform departments – unfolded between secret operations, hidden interventions, underground aid, “bureaucrats” in camouflage and “councilors” in defense of illegal arsenals. The intelligence obeyed orders protected by the utmost reserve and reported his work with deliberately ambiguous relationships.
The crisis manifested itself in the early 1950s when the French were forced to abandon the colonies of Southeast Asiastarting with Indocina. Vietnam – with “provisional” provision – was divided into two administrations, pending elections intended to ensure a single government in the entire country.
In reality, the president of the South Ngo Dhien Diem refused the vote, claiming that the North could not express himself freely because he was intoned by the communist propaganda of Ho Chi Minh. Soviet Union and China took the “red” – the “Cong” – and to prepare them to fight against opponents who – it was not difficult to understand it – should soon face. The US – they too on the war footing – armed the South by presiding him with more robust contingents from time to time.
The Americans let themselves be convinced that the fragility of the anti -communist deployment depended on the president of South Vietnam. Who, despite being personally a good person, was as besieged by ranks of relatives who dominated the country making him hostile. The US secret services approved the getting rid of it, offering any complicity useful for the execution of the crime. Starting with the direct intervention of the President of the States John Fitzgerald Kennedy who imposed on the American ambassador to Saigon – Henry Cabot Lodge – to “let it”.
Counterproductive result. The government of South Vietnam (from 1 November 1963) ended up in the hands of a general – Dong Van Minh – who, in addition to relying on corrupt men, was himself of questionable morality. The consent in favor of the communists and – worse – the antipathy towards the Yankee went on.
In Washington, “the Vietnam problem” was left to pose in the dark corners of the White House where the “delicate” decisions were taken by the president And from that restricted circle of trusted collaborators who – even then, with evident disappointment – was indicated as “the Camelot court”. Kennedy would have been King Arthur and the others was attributed the title of knights of the round table.
The operational indications were kept at this level of confidentiality to be left in the dark even the vice president Lyndon Johnson. Who, taking over from the presidency (November 22, 1963) when Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, found himself struggling with a question of which he knew neither the details of the context nor the commitments he was bound. He moved with the superficiality suggested by information that, more than summary, proved unreliable. And, on the basis of a half truth and a huge lie, he openly sided the army which, until then, had operated with camouflaged interventions.
The spark that turned on the fire of the war shone in the Gulf of Tonchino where the American destroyer Maddox and a Vietnamese motorboat collide. No American victims and four dead on the other side. Subsequent research believed that it was an accident determined by an involuntary error of the Viet helmsman. Of course, the attack reported in the following days that served to credit a sort of escalation against the US forces did not take place and, therefore, the need to respond firmly. On the basis of reports that – falsely – reported an unanimously caused (unanimously) and the Senate (with two contrary votes) to an “unequivocal attack” approved (7 August 1964) the resolution that allowed the president to “assume the necessary measures (including the use of the armed forces) to assist each member state of the seato who requests assistance to defense of his own free sovereignty”.
The Seato (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) recalled a “defense pact” signed in Manila in 1954 to protect some countries in the area. Although it was completely clear that with that text a military campaign in Vietnam is settled, the declaration – as it had been formulated (and voted) – had maintained an apparently neutral form. Moreover, the topic had to seem marginal importance. The members of the congress knew – really – where was Tonchino? And, of course, nobody hypothesized that American power could meet obstacles. What danger could he come from a Marmaglia without uniform, that he fitted homemade sandals and shot with fertos?
The truth is that the time of the beginning is known but not that of the end. On March 2, 1965 the first bombing was unleashed and six days later the Marines landed on the South Vietnam coasts. With the soldiers already there, they reached 25 thousand, destined to reach half a million when the clash became more harsh.
Johnson showed himself confident enough to ensure that that operation would take place “with the same comfort guaranteed by the night shirt as a grandmother”. The secretary of state Robert McNamara threatened to precipitate on that clove of the territory “more bombs than those falling on Italy, Germany and Japan put together”. I have Chi Minh – it is not known if for boldness or by conviction – he replied that “they could also lose a thousand men for every American” but that “in the end, they would have won”.
The Americans believe – they always believe it – to hurry up the question quickly, affirming their superiority. Instead they found themselves entangled in the spiral of a conflict that had nothing conventional and that developed – man against man – in ambushes that unleashed the soldiers accustomed to other types of combat. The tactical provisions, sent by heart for the exams in the Academy, did not serve in the midst of tens of square kilometers of trees each of which hid the danger of an enemy.
There were no battles in the open field. The Americans were involved in an uninterrupted series of ambushes that the Viet Cong practiced when they were in the most favorable conditions. They were “biting and run” clashes. The Yankee did not manage to respond effectively so much that, as attackers, they found themselves attacked. They poisoned the forests with dioxin – the “orange agent” – who had to defore the jungle to remove shelter from enemies. Millions of tons of explosives and the Napalm fire in every corner were overturned without paying to collateral damage. They did not hold back from bombing Laos and Cambogia accused of offering shelter to retreating Viet Congs. And they showed the fierce face to the farmers, with the result of inimicating them completely.
They went on ten years during which mountains of victims were picked who indignant American public opinion to create unbearable pressure on the government. Useless – and harmful – continue.
In January 1973 the first approaches began for a partial “cease” that had to anticipate the end of the conflict and the retreat of the Americans. Henry Kissinger who had managed the war years integrated the negotiations – not easy – for its end.
Who did not spare queues of ferocious controversy. Those who complained of an America stamped that had not completed the work that began and those who accused her of having started an unjust war, with the aggravating circumstance of the use of infamous methods and ignoble tools.
The soldiers returned home to the physicist and marked forever in morality. They found themselves marginalized in a society that first, had forced them to smear the machine guns but who, then, had been ashamed of asking him.
It takes some time for the screens of cinematographers to be able to tell of Rambo who demanded respect for having fought by order of others.
