After Trump, it is Putin’s turn in Xi’s court. Between the Ukrainian crisis, energy and strategic partnerships, Moscow and Beijing can no longer do without each other.
Not even a week away visit Of Donald Trumpthe Chinese President Xi Jinping is preparing to receive another special guest in its Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.
If it is true that the American President’s visit was initially scheduled for March, what is certain is that the timing of Trump and Putin’s visits, so close to each other, leaves ample room for interpretation. A simple coincidence or the beginning of the dress rehearsal of a division of the world?
What is certain is that for China the Russian President’s visit has the aim of coordinating with what is now a very close ally, but also, more prosaically, of project an image of power and stability in a world increasingly marked by wars, energy crises and trade tensions.
The objective of the visit, as reported by the Kremlin, will be to further develop the “privileged and special strategic partnership” existing between the two countries, also and above all in light of recent geopolitical events in the Middle East.
Putin’s visit plan
The first foreign visit of 2026 could only be to China for the Russian President. In fact, since 2022 Beijing has risen to the Kremlin’s first partnernot only economically, but also and above all politically.
Therefore, the program of Putin’s 25th visit to China will include both the commercial and political dossiers.
It begins this evening, when the reception and the first formal institutional meetings linked to the 25th anniversary of the “Treaty of good neighborliness and friendly cooperation” between the two countries, signed in 2001.
Tomorrow will then be the moment of the expected bilateral Putin-Xi, focused on the main current hot topics. The outcomes of the very recent meeting between the Chinese President and Donald Trump, the war in Ukraine and military cooperation (in conjunction with the nuclear exercises started by Moscow today).
There will also be the signature of a strategic document focused on promoting a “multipolar world” and for a new model of international relations. A fact on which both nations have long been aligned and which they have strongly advocated for several years, also through the format of Brics.
The Russian President will then meet the Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiangto deepen trade ties under Western sanctions.
Clutches on the Power of Siberia-2
In-depth discussions will mostly concern the massive gas pipeline project Power of Siberia-2which last year was the subject of the signature of a memorandum of understanding binding, the construction of which has not yet begun.
The new 2,600 kilometer mega-plant will have to cross Mongolia to transport 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year from the arctic fields of Yamal to northern China.
Gazprom would like to apply a market formula anchored to global prices, similar to that historically used for supplies destined for Europe: Beijing, on the other hand, requires a massive discount and highly subsidized tariffsaware of its bargaining power as Moscow’s “de facto sole customer”.
However, it is also convenient for China to invest in the energy partnership with Moscow; Russian onshore gas pipelines represent one fundamental strategic protection against possible Western naval blockades in the event of military escalation on Taiwan. Without forgetting the prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which blocked Qatari LNG exports.
Moscow therefore aims to break the impasse, and it is no coincidence that for the visit to China, in addition to Putin, the leaders of Gazprom And Rosneftrespectively Alexei Miller And Igor Sechin; Moscow proposes a framework agreement on total annual volumes to postpone the precise definition of prices to a later date, all aimed at starting construction as soon as possible.
The “forced” alliance
The visit certainly serves to strengthen the “limitless alliance” between Moscow and Beijing at a very delicate moment. If many words and much ink have been spent regarding the support offered by Beijing to Moscow since the invasion of Ukrainehowever little has been underlined how this support was more than convenient for Beijing.
China has in fact increased by 50% its exports to Russia from 2022, while Russian gas and oil are still sold to Beijing at a discount compared to the market one.
In addition to these economic reasons, the war in Ukraine and (for a few months) that in the Middle East are serving a Beijing’s primary strategic interest, forcing the United States and Europe to concentrate resources, financial and political support in theaters far from the Taiwanese one.
In other words, the war in Ukraine ensures that Europeans do not have the means and political will to intervene in Taiwan; the one in Iran, however, it causes the United States to consume precious means and resources in the Middle Eastern theatertaking them away from the Indo-Pacific.
Hormuz’s closure, however, reminds Beijing of just as much as its own export and his import of energy is still dependent on the so-called “bottlenecks” (such as the Strait of Malacca). The closure of these strategic waterways can also affect the global economy and trigger global energy crises. Investing in land “bypasses” is therefore in Beijing’s full strategic interest, and Moscow knows this very well.
