The framework for the 21st package of sanctions does not seem to have been found yet, but in the meantime Russian LNG imports are at their highest before the definitive ban in 2027.
The European Union wants to approve the 21st package of sanctions against Russia, and it wants to do so as soon as possible, because today, July 15, is the day of the automatic review of the price cap (price limit) on oil exported from Russia, which would rise from 44 to around 58 dollars a barrel.
Yesterday, in fact, the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the EU Member States (Coreper) meeting in Brussels was unable to reach a consensus and approve the new package of sanctions against the Russian Federation.
Why the EU wants to maintain the price cap
The price cap on Russian oil prohibits Western companies from providing insurance and shipping services to Russian crude sold above a certain threshold, until now set at $44.1 per barrel.
Since last year the mechanism has become dynamic, with an automatic adjustment every six months calculated at 15% below the average price of Urals crude recorded over a window of several weeks.
By keeping the ceiling artificially low, Brussels aims to deprive Moscow of some oil revenues while letting Russian crude continue to flow. The problem is that, with the surge in international prices following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the automatic formula would adapt to the price increase that occurred, rising to 58 dollars.
Unanimity is still missing
The last few days have been a succession of failed meetings. Last Friday, Coreper was unable to find the right solution despite the changes made by the Irish presidency to the sanctions scheme.
Progress arrived on Sunday, but not enough, Coreper recorded important steps forward, leaving the foreign ministers with the task of addressing the issues still open in the Foreign Affairs Council on Monday.
That meeting, however, also ended without agreement. High Representative Kaja Kallas, whose only job seems to be to place sanctions on Russia, obviously expressed her disappointment, while assuring that an agreement was close. Yesterday, Tuesday, yet another unsuccessful attempt, .
The crossed vetoes of the EU countries
The package, which the Commission intended to affect fishing, LNG, financial transactions and cryptocurrencies, was progressively emptied of national objections. On the fish front, Portugal and Germany respectively defended cod for bacalhau and Alaskan pollock used by the frozen fish sticks industry, leading the Irish presidency to scrap the entire chapter, which was still worth only 2.7% of the total imports from Russia.
Greece, one of the world’s major shipping powers, opposes restrictions on LNG carriers carrying Russian LNG, fearing a direct blow to its own shipping companies.
Rumen Radev’s Bulgaria initially blocked the inclusion of Patriarch Kirill on the blacklist, dissolving the reservation only after the name was removed. Austria maintains a reservation on the entire package, linked to the request to withdraw 2 billion euros from frozen Russian sovereign assets.
Italy and France have instead obtained a relaxation of the entry ban for Russian veterans, so as not to penalize tourist flows.
European imports of Russian LNG are at their highest
While discussing new sanctions, however, Europe is importing Russian LNG at record levels. According to the Urgewald organization, which cites Kpler data, EU countries paid around 5.96 billion euros for LNG cargoes from Yamal between January and June 2026, with the majority of shipments going to France, Belgium and Spain.
European ports received 136 of the 140 total loads shipped from the Yamal LNG plant in the first half of the year, over 97% of the total, a volume growing by 16-18% compared to the same period in 2025. In practice, Europe is hoarding the entire production of the Arctic plant controlled by Novatek in the months preceding the definitive stop.
In fact, the ban on imports of Russian LNG through long-term contracts will come into force from January 1, 2027, while pipeline gas will be banned later in the same year. A short circuit that plastically exposes the distance between Brussels’ sanctioning rhetoric and the reality of the energy flows still underway with Moscow
