Iranian floating reserves in Southeast Asia are depleted, according to Kpler. The American naval blockade would have taken away at least $25 billion in oil revenues from the regime, worsening the economic crisis and increasing pressure on the nuclear program.
For months the Iranian government was able to mitigate the effects of the war and trade restrictions thanks to a significant quantity of crude oil kept on board oil tankers stationary in Asian waters. These stocks represented a fundamental strategic reserve: they allowed a Tehran to continue to supply the Chinese market and secure billions in revenue, which is essential to support public finances in a phase of growing difficulty. Now, however, this resource seems to have disappeared. Iranian oil stocks stored at sea in Southeast Asia they were exhausted by mid-October, according to the energy analysis company’s findings Kpler. The naval blockade imposed by the United States would have prevented Iran from replenishing reserves and maintaining the usual flow of supplies destined for Chinese refineries. “There is no more oil to unload in China,” Homayoun Falakshahi, head of crude oil analysis at Kpler, told the Wall Street Journal, describing a situation that risks compromising one of the regime’s main financing channels. The contraction in exports adds to the difficulties that are already affecting us on the Iranian economymarked by rising prices, the devaluation of the national currency and the scarcity of numerous goods. According to the United States Central Commandthe block would have taken away from Tehran at least $25 billion in oil revenues. A loss that could significantly reduce the resources available to repair industrial plants damaged by the war and rebuild military arsenals. The admiral Brad Cooperat the head of the American Central Command, argued that US operations have inflicted very heavy damage on the Iranian security structure, increasing the economic cost of the confrontation. However, Tehran’s crackdown on exports has not completely interrupted energy traffic in the region. Crude oil from other Gulf countries continues to reach international markets and overall volumes have recently exceeded those recorded before the war. The American military presence actually helps protect the transit of non-Iranian supplies through the Strait of Hormuz.
The oil tanker network and the relationship with Beijing
The system used byIran to circumvent American sanctions has developed progressively in recent years. Its operation also relies on a network of tankers that allows crude oil to be transferred between different vessels before delivery to the final recipient. Vessels linked to Tehran transported the oil to maritime areas off the coast of Malaysia and Singapore. In those waters the cargo was transferred to other oil tankers, tasked with continuing the journey towards China. The multiplication of steps made the identification of the origin of supplies and the application of US sanctions against the operators involved more complex. The same maritime areas also performed a second function: they allowed large quantities of crude oil to be stored awaiting sale. In this way, Iran had built a sort of offshore warehouse, useful for continuing to trade even when restrictions hindered direct exports. The current problem also concerns the timing of payments. According to energy analysts, the sums paid by Chinese buyers can take around two months to be transferred and accounted for. Tehran could therefore still receive some revenue from previous deliveries, but these would be resources destined to progressively decrease if new sales do not resume.
The economic crisis increases pressure on the regime
For over six months, Iranian authorities have tried to demonstrate that naval restrictions would not be enough to cause the country’s economic collapse or force the leadership to change its position on the nuclear program. During this period, Tehran has tried to compensate for logistical difficulties by stockpiling oil in unused depots and resorting to road transport to neighboring states. Solutions that have made it possible to maintain a certain commercial capacity, without however being able to replace the volumes normally moved via maritime routes. The prospect remains particularly difficult because crude oil sales constitute an essential component of Iranian public finances. Falakshahi estimates that the oil sector contributes around 30-40% of state revenue and represents the main source of foreign exchange. Making the picture even more complicated is the loss in value of the rial. Since the beginning of July, the Iranian currency has lost around a third of its value against the dollar, exacerbating price pressures and reducing the population’s purchasing power. According to the analyst Kplerthe American strategy aims to exploit these difficulties to change the calculations of the Iranian leadership. The contraction of financial resources could push the government to resume negotiations and accept an agreement on nuclear power. Another possibility is that worsening economic conditions fuel internal protests, testing the authorities’ ability to maintain control.
Offshore inventories fell to lows
The data reconstructed from Kpler show the extent of the change. At the start of the war, in February 2026, Iran had approximately 135 million barrels of oil abroad, largely stored in the waters off the coast of Malaysia And Singapore. After the increase in energy prices, the total value of these reserves was estimated at at least 10 billion dollars. When Washington introduced the first blockade against Iranian oil flows last April, Tehran continued to use supplies already at sea to fuel sales. This strategy allowed supplies to be temporarily maintained, but caused a rapid decrease in available quantities. The suspension of restrictions in mid-June, as part of the peace negotiations, had offered all‘Iran the opportunity to increase exports again and replenish reserves. However, the recovery was interrupted by the reintroduction of the American lockdown in mid-July. Floating stocks, which in the meantime had reached almost 90 million barrels, decreased until they fell below one million by October 5th. According to Kpler, they subsequently ran out. Also Emma Li, an analyst at the energy monitoring company Vortexreported a sharp contraction. His estimates indicated the presence of around six million barrels of Iranian crude oil in the waters off the coast of Iran Singapore to October 9th. Meanwhile, Chinese refiners have reportedly begun turning more frequently to other suppliers, including Brazil and oil producers.West Africa. A similar assessment was formulated by United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), an organization that monitors and counteracts Iranian oil activities. According to the group, exports of Tehran would have fallen to near zero in August and September, while reserves held on tankers in Southeast Asia may have fallen to ten million barrels or less by early October. Charlie Brown, researcher of UANIobserved that the picture indicates a situation of increasing difficulty, while recognizing the impossibility of determining the residual quantity with absolute precision.
Alternative routes are not enough
The use of land transport and other trade routes could allow Iran to maintain some exports, but will hardly compensate for the loss of maritime connections. Oil tankers can move quantities of crude oil that are enormously greater than those that can be transferred through currently available alternatives. Iman Nasseri, senior vice president for Middle East and Asia from energy consultancy FGE NexantECAbased in Dubai, believes that these solutions can still work. Their effectiveness, however, does not eliminate the uncertainties about the stability of the Iranian system in the long term. Nasseri recalled that the regime has already demonstrated in the past a notable ability to adapt to external pressures. For this reason, he invited us to evaluate the evolution of the situation over a broader time horizon, rather than considering an immediate collapse inevitable. Tehran’s official position remains marked by firmness. During a meeting of International Monetary Fund to Bangkok, last week, central bank governor Abdolnaser Hemmati dismissed predictions of an imminent economic collapse, arguing that the country had demonstrated significant resilience. The central point therefore remains the duration of American pressure. The depletion of offshore reserves reduces one of the main tools by which Iran had continued to collect money despite the restrictions. It remains to be seen whether the loss of revenue will be sufficient to change the leadership’s choices on the nuclear dossier or whether Tehran will once again be able to find new channels to support its economy.
