In the 21st century power is no longer measured only in square kilometers or military arsenals, but in the ability to control the raw materials essential to advanced technology. “Geopolitics of Rare Earths“, written by Paolo Gila And Maurizio Mazziero and published by Hoeplitackles with rigor and clarity one of the central issues of global competition: the dominion over those 17 chemical elements without which there would be no energy, digital, aerospace and military transition. The book first dismantles a cliché: the rare earths they are not really rare from a geological point of view. They are widespread in the earth’s crust, but difficult to extract and above all to refine. But what are the rare earths? Scandium, yttrium, lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium and lutetium. Chemical separation processes are complex, expensive and highly polluting. And it is precisely on this ground that China’s record was built. China has accepted a very high environmental price for decades, developing an industrial system capable of managing not only extraction, but the entire value chain, from purification to storage.
Gila And Mazziero show how this advantage is not random, but the result of a long-term strategy. Already in the Maoist era rare earths they were considered a decisive resource for future economic power. With Deng Xiaoping before and with entry into WTO Then, Beijing he transformed that vision into a coherent industrial policy, supported by state subsidies, environmental deregulation and centralized export control. Today the Asian superpower concentrates most of the world’s production and can use the rare earths as a true geopolitical weapon, modulating supplies and prices according to international tensions. The comparison with the United States it is one of the guiding threads of the volume. Washington appears increasingly aware of its strategic vulnerability: beyond the80% of rare earths used by American industry comes from Chinaincluding those used in the most sensitive defense sectors, from missile systems to jet engines. Hence the rush for new sources of supply and the interest in areas such as GreenlandtheUkraine and theAfricawhich the essay frames as new fronts of a global competition that goes well beyond the economy.
Particularly critical is the position ofEurope. Without a truly effective common strategy, constrained by stringent environmental regulations and chronic decision-making fragmentation, the European Union finds itself caught between dependence on China and the inability to develop an autonomous supply chain. Recycling and the circular economy, while necessary, are not enough to close the gap. The outcome is growing strategic exposure just as the green and digital transition exponentially increases demand for rare earths. However, the book is not limited to the geopolitical dimension. An entire part is dedicated to finance and investments, showing how a still opaque but rapidly expanding market is developing around these strategic raw materials. The absence of official trading exchanges makes prices opaque, but funds, ETFs and financial vehicles are already intercepting the rush for critical resources. It is the signal that the latter is increasingly reflected directly on the markets, transforming the strategic choices of States into opportunities – and risks – for investors. “Geopolitics of Rare Earths“is therefore much more than a technical study. It is an interpretative map of the world that is emerging, in which competition for resources replaces ideological competition and in which technological supremacy depends on the control of invisible but decisive elements. An essay that helps to understand why the future will not only be played out in the palaces of diplomacy or on the battlefields, but also in mines, chemical laboratories and global supply chains. Because, as the authors show, whoever controls rare earths today controls the conditions of power tomorrow.
