Separating Russia from China was Donald Trump’s strategic goal for the entire duration of his first term in the White House. A lot of water has flowed under the bridge since then, but it’s worth asking how strong the ties are within the authoritarian club of which China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are members. Despite its dominant position, Beijing seems to have difficulty keeping its partners in line, who prefer to “exchange” with Moscow. Over the past decade, China’s leaders have felt growing unease over Beijing’s loss of influence over North Korea, and its own inability to contain Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Such fears intensified in 2023, when North Korea significantly strengthened ties with Russia.
In June this year, Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin signed a military alliance treaty, promising mutual assistance in case of attacks. In October, Pyongyang sent troops to Russia to support the offensive against Ukraine, after months of supplying weapons and ammunition to Moscow. Despite the alliance between the two states and the ongoing military support in Ukraine, Beijing has preferred to avoid making any statements. For diplomats and historians, the renewed military alliance between North Korea and Russia is noteworthy. On the one hand there is obviously attention to the overall stability of Northeast Asia. On the other hand, the dynamic recalls in some respects the Korean War of 1950 in which Mao Zedong, although reluctant, allowed himself to be dragged into that conflict.
Kim Il-sung, without consulting Beijing, launched the attack on South Korea. The Grand Helmsman, furious, called the action a betrayal, but had to take action, intervening to prevent the collapse of the Pyongyang regime. Similarly, today the Chinese leadership may feel equally betrayed by the Korea-Russia axis. Kim Jong-un, like his grandfather, seems to ignore Beijing’s interests in his strategy of rapprochement with Moscow. Compared to 1950, power relations have changed profoundly. The Dragon is now the dominant power in the China-Russia-North Korea triangle. Moscow, weakened by the war in Ukraine, is economically dependent on the Asian giant. Likewise, Pyongyang remains strongly tied to China, which accounts for 90 percent of its foreign trade. Despite this position of strength, Xi Jinping does not resort to explicit pressure as Mao and, subsequently, Deng Xiaoping did. The latter, for example, in 1985 urged the People’s Republic not to give in to North Korean demands, avoiding being dragged into unnecessary conflicts.
Also noteworthy is the axis between Russia and Iran. Beijing is a major buyer of Iranian oil but has shown caution in deepening strategic or military collaboration with Tehran. Despite the 25-year strategic partnership agreement signed between Iran and China in 2021, implementation has been limited and has pushed Tehran towards Moscow. The growing Russian-Iranian closeness has emerged in critical sectors such as defense, military technology and energy. A case in point is Iran’s role in supplying Shahed-136 drones and munitions to Russia for the conflict in Ukraine, an arrangement that has sparked international concern and sanctions from the United States. These drones were used to target civilian and military infrastructure in Ukraine, cementing the Islamic Republic’s role as Moscow’s key partner in the invasion.
In exchange, Russia has offered Tehran support to modernize its military arsenal. Although some supplies, such as Su-35 fighters, have been postponed, cooperation continues to include assistance in improving Iran’s ballistic missiles and air defense. The joint construction of a drone factory on Russian territory is another sign of the intensity of this agreement. Iran sees Russia as an essential bank to counter American influence and regional alliances supported by Washington, such as those with Israel and the Gulf states.
