Economy

First World War: the Carnage of the Isonzo

It was supposed to be a quick and victorious attack, that of June 21, 1915, and instead the offensive of the Italian army against the Austro-Hungarian army, which dragged on until July 7, was a bloodbath: 3,500 between deaths and missing, plus 11,500 injured. In order not to conquer even a meter of enemy territory.

More than May 24 (1915) – when “the Piave murmured” – World War began on June 21st With the offensive that history archives as the “first battle of the Isonzo”. The attack sought in the ingredly and dragged himself until 7 July with counterproductive results. In order not to conquer even one meter, 15 thousand soldiers were sacrificed: 3,500 dead and missing and 11,500 injured. Others were the ambitions of the eve. With the fist of iron and heart of ice, the General Staff was led by Luigi Cadorna who deserved the title of “Generalissima”. The officers were convinced that the war would be resolved in a “amen” to the point of not worrying about the winter kit to be assigned to all those men mobilized for the front. “I had heard it …” Finance Minister Francesco Nitti complained. “I heard it with these ears …! If Italy had entered the war, we could be sure that, within a month, we would have been to Trieste and, from day, threaten the nerve centers of Austria …! “.

Velleitarian, considering the forces on the field and the preparation of the commands. The soldiers were peasants who, willingly, would have continued to split their backs on the clods of the earth. They were not warriors and finding a rifle in the hands (which they did not know how to use) did not reassure them at all. Orders had heard on them, with a linguistic cadence that did not recognize as their own. And they did not understand where they were going because, those areas, they hadn’t practiced them even on geographical paper. As for the officers, they kept the mentality of the employees, punctually clinging to the degree and in the place. The academies, other than correcting them, enhanced the defects. The teachers seemed to be careful only to the external forms. The only book that was necessary to read was the tactic manual. “Generals also are very little valid.” Word of Giovanni Giolitti who, in an impetus of intellectual honesty, photographed the army summit for that nothing he was able to do. «They have the command of an army: the Brusati who would be enough for a regiment; The frugoni that, of the many bestialities, we had to recall from Libya and Zuccari which is only an eleganton. The only one who gives confidence is the Nava ».

To truth, in the first three weeks, They could also have crumbled the front because there were no enemies to defend it. The Austrians knew that Italy would enter the war against them but the soldiers were engaged on the Russian front, so much so that the defense of the southern borders was entrusted to a few thousand “territorial” which would be like saying “urban police”. The tricolor army cannot take advantage of enormously favorable circumstances. The “first army” entered into action quickly to stop immediately. After a few shootings, the Austrian “territorial” retired on the positions they had already identified and the Italians chased them but taking care to remain at a fair distance. When General Antonio Cantore began to imagine a more sent to action rhythm, on May 27, he was replaced. The “V Army Corps”, employed by General Florenzio Aliprindi, did not sketch even a glimmer of action. The commander was a conscientious officer, convinced that the homeland should be served by evading the waste of the military bureaucracy. The sign of an inch of the pencil, on the document, indicated that the text did not affect him; half a centimeter, which intended to reread it; The point meant that it was supposed to talk about it. The first movements stationed in a meticulous punctuation on pieces of paper. On June 26 it was replaced. In fact, his military campaign did not even start. When they called him up he was still investigated in census the protocols of his competence, to order them according to the title of importance.

The “IV Army” had had grandiose tasks. Too. He had to “take beyond the border, go down to Val Pusterìa, get around the Trentino salient and compete for the breakthrough of the opposing defenses, at Villach”. General Luigi Nava – the only one to whom Giolitti would have been willing to entrust some responsibilities – found a golden occasion on his hands. In front, that veil of “territorial” destined to shatter to the first assault. But the officer did not feel at ease and, showing himself more hesitant than bold, he spent time writing kilometers messages to examine a range of hypotheses including what the enemy could appear with superior forces. Therefore, addressing the body commanders, he illustrated his strategies and asked for advice to “their excellence” which, in the text, were indicated with the abbreviations ll.ee. Therefore “they will promptly meditate on the considerations on the matter and undergo the acts of first offense, in their opinion, which, in their opinion, can be better carried out for the benefit of our further operations and without incurring in more serious risks”. The blitz, in that sector, was resolved with the occupation of Cortina d’Ampezzo, already evacuated by the Austrians for a week.

Next, General Clemente Lequio found the road barred by the forts of Malborghetto and Predil. It was necessary to bomb them but he didn’t even have a piece of artillery. To the messages to get some cannon they replied promptly in writing, ensuring that they did but do not take care to follow up on commitments. With the result that the department was able to shoot the first shots on June 12, out of time to take advantage of the surprise factor. The favorable opportunity also touched General Pietro Frugoni who, at the offensive, believed it to the point of committing to give her body. He went down to the Isonzo Valley, occupied the Caporetto plain but there – inexplicably – stopped, frightened by his own audacity. Those first weeks of war at the speed of the Formica gave time to the Austrian generals – Franz Conrad and Svetozar Boroevic von Bojna – to prepare effective defenses capable of holding the assaults of the tricolor wards. The idea of ​​marching triumphantly in the heart of the Austro-Hungarian Empire could be archived. And when the war really began, it was clear that the corpses would pave that land. In the first battle, the departments should have moved, articulating the assaults, in order to focus on the heights of the Podgora, on Mount Kuk and towards the Karst. The same official report – justifying the negative result – agreed that “the attacks took place independent and each with their own character”. Without adequate coordination and with approximate organization. In fact, the departments were launched in the bare.

Robert Skorpil who, on the Costoni del Podgora, guided a contingent of Vienna told her like this. “They approached the trenches but, against them, a hellish fire opened which determined its rapid retreat.” If the defense protections had not even been affected, did it make sense to continue the action? The Austrians themselves were surprised that other soldiers were sent to the assault. “A similar proceeding” always from the Skorpil diary “was frighteningly punished. At 30 steps, the attackers received the defense of the defender who was so deadly that the attack forehead was completely destroyed ». The attack on the Kuk was also described by Ugo Ojetti who, although from a different perspective, used similar images. “We threw ourselves with head down, for the steep slopes discovered. Four brigades tried to break through in a triangle of just over a basic kilometer. Imagine the carnaio in front of the almost intact criminals ». Paradoxically, the action towards the Karst (to which little importance was attributed) was obtaining interesting results. On that front, considered secondary, the army of the Duke of Aosta Emanuele Fliberto was causing the breakdown of the opposing device. But the departments engaged in combat have no longer made it. Reinforcements that did not arrive were needed. The Austrians had time to reorganize themselves and, when the “27th division” was in the condition to intervene, the favorable moment had gone.