Germany has realized that decades of economic ties unbalanced towards the Dragon are taking their toll. Backtracking, however, is complicated
The cancellation of Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul’s trip to China marks a watershed in relations between Berlin and Beijing. When the Chinese authorities confirmed only a meeting with their counterpart Wang Yi, refusing to organize further high-level talks, the German government made an unprecedented decision: to postpone the visit of the felucca leader scheduled for the end of October. Upon closer inspection, it was not a simple diplomatic hitch, but the manifestation of a profound transformation that is redefining decades of economic and political relations between Berlin and Beijing.
The weight of German industry and dependence on Beijing
Just as energy mercantilism with Russia characterized Gerhard Schröder’s seven-year term and above all Angela Merkel’s 16 years, so German heavy industry has built a very strong bond with the Chinese market over the last twenty years. The Teutonic chemical industry has even increased its dependence on China in recent years, with the 46 percent of companies of the sector which in 2024 declared to depend on Chinese intermediate inputs, growing by five percentage points compared to 2022. Giants such as Basf they alone represented the 34 percent of European direct investments in the Dragon in the period 2018-2021. In the industrial automation sector, Siemens has intertwined its control systems with communist critical infrastructure, while in the automotive Volkswagen, BMW and Mercedes-Benz have continued to increase their exposure to the local market despite growing geopolitical risks.
This mutual dependence, which for years was presented as a guarantee of stability, has turned into one strategic vulnerability. The industrial elites of the “Deutschland Ag” (the historical intertwining of banks, large companies and insurance companies, ed.) have not only influenced German industrial policy, but have exercised a decisive influence on the entire European policy towards Beijing.
Wadephul in Baerbock’s wake
Let’s get back to the bombshell: Wadephul does not represent a break with the line of his predecessor Annalena Baerbock who, during the Scholz government, stood out for clear and unprecedented positions. Wadephul continued in this vein, raising issues of China’s export restrictions on rare earths and semiconductors, criticizing Beijing’s activities in the South China Sea as threats to the rules-based global order, and rejecting Chinese calls for a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” When Beijing protested against his language, the minister reiterated his positions.
Merz against the “axis of autocracies”
Even the chancellor Friedrich Merzwho is expected to visit China after Wadephul, despite having to deal with a coalition partner like the SPD which traditionally maintains softer positions towards Xi Jinping, does not seem willing to give up the point. Merz described China as part of a «axis of autocracies» together with Russia, Iran and North Korea, it has warned German businesses about the risks of investing in the country and offered clear support for Taiwan, framing Germany’s approach in the context of “a new systemic conflict” between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes.
Yet the tension within the coalition is palpable. While Wadephul canceled his trip planned for the next few days, the socialist vice-chancellor Lars Klingbeil confirmed his visit to China scheduled for mid-November. The SPS, despite having taken critical positions on human rights and infrastructure security, maintains an approach that favors dialogue and economic interests.
End of German naivety
The reality is that Germany finds itself caught between geopolitical imperatives And structural economic dependencies which would take decades to reduce. German exports to China, adjusted for inflation, have been declining since 2018, and Beijing has slipped to fifth place among German export destinations in 2024. But German production under the Great Wall is replacing exports from the Federal Republic, creating an even deeper form of dependence that is difficult to break.
The worsening of relations between the two countries is therefore the belated awareness of a reality that other Western partners have already understood. In short, it has also arrived in Germany an end to naivety in the relationship with Beijingbut the price of decades of addiction will be steep and long to pay.
