The collapse of Bashar al-Assad has as its immediate corollary the demotion of Moscow from the rank of great power. What turns out to be significant above all are the consequences that the collapse of the Alawite regime has for Russia’s maritime operations. To better reconstruct the strategic context, it should be remembered that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had already led to heavy naval losses for Moscow, with the Black Sea transformed into a “tuna trap” by anti-ship missiles and Ukrainian drones (and by decisive British support). The culminating moment with a strong symbolic figure has so far been represented by the sinking of the cruiser “Moskva”, flagship of the Black Sea fleet. This was followed by a substantial impairment of the operational capacity of the Russian navy, and the withdrawal of many units in the port of Novorossiysk.
International sanctions imposed on Russia due to the war in Ukraine have further complicated the situation. Restrictions on Moscow’s shipping companies and their operations make it difficult to transport goods and resources across the seas. Companies such as Hapag Lloyd and Maersk have already closed their offices in Ukrainian ports, limiting options for maritime trade. This economic isolation not only affects Russia’s ability to support its naval operations, but also reduces its access to global markets.
Syria’s regime change now opens a new, decisive front. The Mediterranean in fact represents a crucial area for Moscow, not only for its strategic position but also for the logistical support it offers to operations in Syria. The port of Tartus, for example, is the only permanent Russian naval outpost in the Mediterranean and allows the Kremlin to maintain a military presence in the region. However, with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, its maritime access is compromised. The Tartus base now finds itself surrounded by hostile forces. Moscow, despite having offered asylum to the former Syrian leader after many years of support, wants to go all out in negotiations with the new forces in power. On the other hand, the deadweight loss of Tartus would not only reduce Russia’s influence in the Middle East, but would also jeopardize maritime operations to Africa and beyond. Russia’s nascent base in Libya itself is now seriously at risk. Russia’s maritime difficulties will soon have broader repercussions on a geopolitical level.
Vladimir Putin in fact, it finds itself deprived of access to warm waters, and its warships can now reach the Mediterranean only by starting from the Arctic or the Baltic, with a long and uneconomical circumnavigation around Europe via Gibraltar.
In many ways, Putin appears on the verge of having a “Battleship Potemkim” moment. The reference is to Sergei Eisenstein’s 1925 cinematic masterpiece, the same one that Fantozzi, the character played by Paolo Villaggio, was forced to watch again to exhaustion at the company film club. Eisenstein’s film depicted the mutiny of the battleship “Potemkim” (in the Black Sea) two decades earlier in the context of the Russo-Japanese conflict. With the collapse of Assad and the difficulties of the Russian navy in accessing the warm seas, the situation begins to recall that of the imperial navy before the war with Tokyo and the searing defeat suffered at Tsushima in 1905.
At that time Moscow’s Baltic fleet was forced to circumnavigate the globe to reach the Pacific theater of operationsafter traditional sea routes had been blocked by the Japanese. The need to avoid the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean led the Russians to undertake a long and exhausting journey around Africa. And it was a disaster: the fleet arrived exhausted and ill-prepared for the decisive battle against the Japanese navy, suffering a catastrophic defeat – with the destruction of two thirds of the ships – which marked a turning point in the war and was the warning light of heavy internal ailments. 1917 wasn’t that far away.
