A few days after the failed Iranian attack against Israel, an Israeli response is awaited in Tehran which could also hit the structures where the regime develops nuclear weapons. How close is the Islamic Republic to nuclear weapons?
After more than a dozen violations of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) since July 2019, Tehran now has enough enriched uranium to make two to five nuclear weapons. Typically, the weaponization process – the transformation of the material into a warhead – would require an additional period ranging from several months to a year. However, the IAEA, the UN’s nuclear watchdog, has very limited visibility into Iran’s nuclear program after the regime decided to scale back cooperation. Its missiles are inherently capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. Add to this the fact that Western intelligence has a poor record in terms of identifying illicit nuclear programs, and it is possible that the road to building weapons has already begun.
The New York Times writes that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian was warned of the attack on Israel “only shortly before it began, which shows that the Iranian regime was divided over the operation and that divisions in the government are now likely to increase.” Is there really this rift and what can happen?
The real power in Iran lies in the hands of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). Any major foreign policy decisions would be made by his office with guaranteed support from the IRGC. Even if President Pezeshkian had not been informed before the attack, talk of a rift is not significant in this context. He has no say in major foreign policy decisions and would understand and accept that his authority is limited to domestic matters. Furthermore, Pezeshkian justified his country’s attack on Israel. Despite the media talking about his reputation as a “moderate”, he is a regime insider and a staunch supporter of Khamenei. The role of the IRGC goes far beyond Iran’s regular armed forces: its task “is to protect the integrity of the Islamic Republic”
How long can Iran maintain its military apparatus and send weapons, missiles and drones to its proxies?
It is clear that Iran can maintain a war posture for a long time, especially in terms of offensive capabilities. Iran has the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East. Lacking other dimensions of an advanced military machine, such as a sophisticated air force, its missile program is a key strategic axis. Originally based on Russian, North Korean and Chinese designs, Iran has been developing its missiles since the early 1980s and has successfully transferred tens of thousands of them to its terror proxies over the years. Iran is estimated to have 3,000 ballistic missiles, the most powerful type in its arsenal. As a much cheaper option, drones/UAVs have proven to be an inexpensive but increasingly important complement to Iran’s military options, especially in recent years. However, all this is limited. The ability to produce and deploy missiles is limited primarily by liquidity. This is why it is essential to deprive the regime of its main source of income: oil. Since January 2021, the regime has sold $100 billion in oil due to non-enforcement of US sanctions. Defense capabilities are much less certain, again due to technological limitations, which is why the regime seeks the ultimate insurance policy of a nuclear weapon to not only defend but also threaten its Middle Eastern neighbors.
What have been the West’s main mistakes towards Iran so far and is there a way to correct them? And where to start?
In Western capitals there is a consolidated perception that the Tehran regime can be moderated, curbed or otherwise “tamed”. The Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) was explicitly based on the flawed assumption that economic incentives would cause Iran to fundamentally change its malign behavior. Ten years later, Iran has not softened its behavior at all, even during the deal when the United States was a signatory. This is the major flaw in Western thinking that has informed all the bad politics of the last two decades. It may seem hard to believe for the average Westerner, but the main decision makers in Iran are real ideologues who believe in the rightness of their radical cause. But for any serious analyst of Iran it is absolutely true. Unfortunately, this is a cause that is not limited to its borders, which is bad enough for the Iranian people. The Islamic Republic wants to export its ideology throughout the Middle East and beyond. It has already succeeded to a large extent in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. There are several broad policies that the West should implement today: diplomatic and economic isolation, the reinstatement and enforcement of international sanctions, the proscription of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, and the closure of all foreign banks linked to the Iranian terrorism, just to name a few. But all this must start with a fundamental shift in how the West perceives the nature of the regime. Just like Islamic terrorist organizations, the Islamic Republic’s devotion to an extreme form of Islamism is the system’s defining feature, not a flaw. It cannot be appeased.
Is regime change possible in Tehran? And if so, when and with which people?
The issue of regime change is ultimately an issue that concerns the Iranian people. Polls and basic logic indicate that a sizable majority of people in Iran would support the end of the Islamic Republic. Unfortunately, the regime has done an excellent job of concentrating power and above all the monopoly on the use of force in its hands. Anti-regime protests emerge periodically, but each time they have been ruthlessly repressed, with thousands of arrests, shootings and deaths. Of course, just like the 1979 Revolution that created the Islamic Republic of Iran, change can be rapid. Anything is possible, but to achieve it will require maximum pressure from the international community, and not just from the United States, against the regime and in support of the Iranian people. Israeli military strikes with US support could accelerate any process towards regime change, but they are obviously not enough on their own. Several possible figures have emerged in the Iranian diaspora as potential replacements – for long-suffering Iranians, it seems that any of them would be a much better option than the current brutal dictatorship of the ayatollahs.
Donald Trump has called for bombing sites where Iran enriches uranium. Is this a conceivable scenario and with what consequences?
Based on historical precedent, long-term politics, and the growing existential threat that Iran poses, it is certainly conceivable. While much more logistically difficult in the case of Iran, Israel has already destroyed two nascent nuclear programs of hostile states in Iraq (in 1981) and Syria (in 2007) using this same method. The “Begin Doctrine,” named after the former Prime Minister, still guides decision-making. Israel – a small “one-bomb country” – simply will not allow Iran to acquire the means of its destruction. From Israel’s perspective, Iran’s ability to produce, and demonstrated willingness to use, nuclear weapons is rapidly approaching the unacceptable line. Tehran is closer to the bomb than at any other time in its history and has just demonstrated, once again, that it has no problem firing hundreds of missiles – each theoretically capable of carrying a nuclear warhead – at its territory. As for the consequences, diplomatically, Israel would no doubt face a whirlwind of international condemnation, just as it did in 1981 and 2007. But this would eventually dissipate. Today, most observers agree that Israel did the world a great favor by removing the Osirak and al-Kibar nuclear sites. Given that Israel recently decapitated Hezbollah, the “flagship” of Iranian terrorism, the likely military consequences from Israel’s Iranian terrorist proxies will likely be less severe than in other circumstances. Lebanese Hezbollah is considered Iran’s “insurance policy”, but the entire leadership was removed in a single instant, losing approximately 100 years of combined experience. Reduced to the last one or two battalions, Hamas is also a much smaller threat. Of course, nothing comes at no cost, and Iran could strike Gulf Arab oil facilities in response, forcing the United States to intervene. Successive US Administrations over the course of two decades have been clear that all options are “on the table” when it comes to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. This has been the consistent policy from George W. Bush to Joe Biden. Former President Trump’s comments therefore fall into the same paradigm, only more explicitly stated.
