North Korea’s military power scares South Korea, but the treaties with the USA, its main trading partner, prevent it from enriching uranium. A violation would lead to sanctions, so the dilemma remains between Washington’s protection and possible reactions from Russia and China
European states are not the only ones who have to think about their own defense. South Korea has long been considered a nation that pursued the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, obviously able to rely on the so-called nuclear umbrella of the United States. Today, however, the strategic context around Seoul has changed radically. North Korea boasts a larger and more sophisticated nuclear and generally missile arsenalwhile confidence in extended US deterrence is diminishing due to American political polarization and doubts about Washington’s willingness to risk its cities for an ally. The result was the birth of a serious national debate on the real need for South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons, an idea that was initially considered marginal and has now become concrete.
The threat from Pyongyang
The triggering factor is certainly the rapid development of weapons by Pyongyang which now deploys short-range ballistic missiles, launchable from mobile locations, therefore difficult to detect and capable of evading the South’s defense. After all, the leader Kim Jong Un has openly embraced the doctrine that allows nuclear weapons if his regime feels threatened. At the same time, the South Koreans doubt that Washington would actually use nuclear weapons to support the counterattack. So in Seoul they have begun to wonder how long they can rely on Washington’s deterrence.
Today, South Korea’s conventional strategy aims to counter the North without resorting to nuclear powerthinking instead of preventive attacks. The air and missile defense system provides layered missile defense, while massive retaliation would see an attack conducted to topple the regime. However, a clear nuclear imbalance remains and prevention depends on highly efficient intelligence. On a technical level, Seoul could develop nuclear weapons relatively quickly. Its industry and launch systems give it what experts call “nuclear latency”, or the ability to build a bomb if necessary, however the civil nuclear agreement between the US and the Republic of Korea prohibits Asians from reprocessing or enriching uranium.
Doubts about US extended deterrence
Washington is unlikely to allow changes, even for its closest allies. And the moment Seoul moved to build a bomb it would risk international isolation with economic repercussions. Domestic politics is divided on this: pro-nuclear weapons argue that only by having independent devices could national survival be guaranteed and that deterrence would also discourage China and Russia from helping Kim Jong Un. But a South Korean bomb would trigger a crisis in relations with Washingtonthe same relationship that underlies all of Seoul’s military and economic security.
In addition to possible sanctions, there could be a flight of investors and the arrival of Chinese retaliation on exports. Another effect would be a regional arms race: Japan may follow suit and Taiwan feel pressured to do the same. Finally, nuclear weapons would not solve Seoul’s greatest vulnerability: being unable to compete against Pyongyang’s massive conventional and chemical-biological forces.
The internal political debate in South Korea
Today, therefore, the issue of nuclear weapons in South Korea is no longer theoretical; North Korea’s arsenal is real and U.S. policy is unpredictable, but their development would impose very costly strategic and economic costs while solving few of the country’s real defense problems. Meanwhile, on Thursday 18 December the South Korean Ministry of Defense declared that it will try to start negotiations with the US to obtain access to fuel for the construction of nuclear-powered submarines. This requires the review of the bilateral nuclear energy agreement and for this reason Seoul will draw up a plan for next year that includes Korea’s principles for both the construction of nuclear-powered submarine units and the new position on nuclear non-proliferation.
From what we read in the national press the establishment of an intergovernmental body is envisaged to designate the project as a national strategic initiativedeveloping safety regulations and ordinances related to the use of nuclear reactors in submarines.
