The war in Ukraine has highlighted the contradictions and vulnerabilities of the Russian military industry. Despite international sanctions imposed since 2014 and strengthened after the 2022 invasion, Moscow continues to produce advanced weapons thanks to Western technologies, exploiting parallel markets and triangulations to circumvent controls.
An exemplary case is the Orešnik ballistic missile, used for the first time against Dnipro on November 21, 2024. This sophisticated weapon is made with the support of German and Japanese machinery, as revealed by an investigation by the Financial Times. Companies such as Siemens, Fanuc and Heidenhain have provided critical technologies for its production, highlighting Russia’s reliance on Western tools. A 2024 video, published by the Russian company Titan Barricades, shows a technician working on a Fanuc CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machine, confirming the use of such technologies in Russian production processes. Investigations conducted by Meduzaand The Insider further verified this usage.
Institutes involved in the development of the Orešnik, such as the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) and the Sozvezdie consortium, posted job advertisements in 2024 explicitly requiring skills on CNC systems provided by Western companies. Even the Stan consortium, officially charged with promoting national technologies, admitted the use of imported machinery. At the Metalloobrabotka2024 trade fair, it was also confirmed that many Chinese machines integrate Western components, such as Heidenhain’s TNC640 systems, which are crucial for missile production.
Cofactr, a company specializing in supply chain management, has mapped a complex global network that allows Russia to access semiconductors and technological components through triangulations with countries such as China and Hong Kong. Analyzes show how Moscow uses both official and unofficial channels to bypass sanctions, revealing Russia’s structural dependence on foreign advanced technologies.
Customs records analyzed by the Financial Timesreveal that, since the beginning of 2024, Russia has imported more than $3 million worth of CNC components, often through Chinese intermediaries. Prominent among these imports is a $345,000 CNC machine delivered to the US-sanctioned BalticIndustrial Company. At the same time, an analysis by the Kiev School of Economics highlighted that, in 2023, Russia purchased one billion dollars worth of American and European chips, with 60% of some components supplied by the Chinese company SunnyTechnology. However, a Bloomberg investigation revealed that Sunny Technology uses fake addresses in Hong Kong, making its operations difficult to trace.
Although Chinese companies represent the main suppliers, field investigations have shown that Russian munitions contain advanced chips from American manufacturers, such as Analog Devices (21% of the 3,871 components analyzed) and Texas Instruments (14%). In 2022, Russia purchased $326 million worth of Analog chips, bypassing the restrictions. Western small arms also continue to be used by the Russian military: the Beretta group, for example, has been indirectly involved in the distribution of rifles in Russia. According to IrpiMedia, since 2022, over 6,254 rifles and 1,107,600 cartridges, produced by Italian companies or controlled by Beretta, have arrived in Russia through triangulations with countries such as Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
This indirect traffic, officially destined for neighboring countries, is supported by UN Comtrade data, which highlights a significant increase in Italian rifle exports to Armenia in the period 2020-2024. A joint investigation conducted by The Insider andInvestigace.cz found that many of these weapons have been used in Russian military competitions, such as the one held last September at the Angarsk range in Crimea, where Russian snipers used Beretta rifles due to their superior performance compared to domestic alternatives.
According to what is reported by the Financial Times, international sanctions have had limited effectiveness. While they reduce direct trade ties, they fail to block flows of technology and weapons, allowing Moscow to circumvent bans through global networks of intermediaries. This strategy, while guaranteeing supplies, increases costs and lengthens production times, highlighting the structural vulnerability of the Russian economy.
So how can Russian rearmament be hindered? Obviously, countering this dynamic would require more effective international coordination, the implementation of stringent controls and an intensification of diplomatic pressure on countries that indirectly facilitate Moscow. Only through concerted action will it be possible to limit the efficiency of the Russian war machine and protect the integrity of the global sanctions regime.
The point is that, despite Russia’s ability to adapt to Western sanctions, its economy highlights a growing dependence on parallel markets to support its technological and military industries. Data from August 2024 reveals that official distributors had approximately 86,000 electronic components, while unauthorized suppliers offered over 4 million units. This imbalance demonstrates the crucial importance of parallel markets in overcoming the limitations imposed by sanctions.
In an already fragile geopolitical landscape, this situation makes an internationally coordinated intervention to strengthen controls and combat these evasive practices even more urgent. Any delay in action not only risks exacerbating global tensions, but could also undermine the credibility of the entire international security system.
