From Venezuela to Greenland, passing through Iran and Cuba. There are numerous fronts that, from a geopolitical point of view, Donald Trump has opened in recent weeks. So much so that, if one were to limit oneself to a superficial reading, the thesis of those who maintain that the American president would act on impulse, without a clear strategy behind him, would seem to be supported. Yet things are not like that. There is a common thread that links all these dossiers. And it is very relevant. In fact, the White House aims to stem the Brics and, in particular, to safeguard the global dominance of the dollar.
Following the capture of Nicolás Maduro, Washington quickly began hoarding Venezuelan oil. “The provisional authorities of Venezuela will deliver to the United States between 30 and 50 million barrels of high-quality sanctioned oil,” Trump declared, then added: “This oil will be sold at its market price and that money will be controlled by me, as President of the United States, to ensure that it is used for the benefit of the people of Venezuela and the United States!” In those same days, the occupant of the White House stated that he was open to selling Caracas crude oil to China and Russia as well.
In this regard, it is worth remembering that Beijing was the main buyer of Venezuelan black gold: oil that it purchased by circumventing US sanctions. In particular, according to the Associated Press, «Venezuela began setting the price of oil in Chinese yuan in 2017 and has accepted payments in currencies other than the dollar in recent years». Well, Trump does not seem to intend per se to prevent the Dragon from continuing to acquire this crude oil (which represents around 4.5 percent of its oil imports). What the American president is really interested in is that Beijing, if necessary, buys it in dollars and under the supervision of the United States. In other words, the occupant of the White House aims to maintain the global dominance of the greenback with particular attention to the issue of energy transactions. Yes, because China is also the main buyer of Iranian crude oil. And, even in this case, it historically makes its purchases, violating US sanctions and paying with its own currency. “Iran ships oil to China using shadow fleet tankers and receives renminbi payments through small Chinese banks,” the Atlantic Council noted in 2024.
Now, according to the Fed, on a general level, the dollar currently represents 58 percent of global currency reserves: an undoubtedly large share but much lower than the 72 recorded in 2001. If we then move on to the raw materials sector, the situation seems to become further complicated. «De-dollarization is most evident in commodity markets, where the greenback’s influence on prices has diminished, reported a JP Morgan study last July. «Due to Western sanctions, Russian oil products exported to the East and South are sold in the local currencies of buyers or in the currencies of countries that Russia considers friends. Among buyers, India, China and Türkiye are using or seeking alternatives to the dollar. Saudi Arabia is also considering adding yuan-denominated futures contracts to its oil pricing model, although progress has been slow,” the US investment bank continued.
An analysis by Oanda, published last November, also underlined that American sanctions on Russia have indirectly favored processes of decoupling from the US currency, as they would have “rapidly accelerated the creation of new financial options and trade routes centered on the Chinese yuan”.
And here we come to an essential point. The dollar issue has always been a central concern for Trump. On January 30, 2025, just a few days after taking office again in the White House, the current American president threatened the Brics due to their de-dollarization intentions. “We will ask these apparently hostile countries to pledge not to create a new Brics currency, nor to support any other currency to replace the mighty US dollar, or they will face 100 percent tariffs,” Trump thundered on Truth. In July, the occupant of the White House increased the dose, stating: «An additional tariff of 10 percent will be applied to any country that aligns itself with the anti-American policies of the Brics. There will be no exceptions to this choice.” All this, without neglecting that Washington has never looked favorably on the People’s Bank of China’s gold rush, not to mention New Delhi’s purchase of Russian oil: a purchase which, according to the Economic Times, takes place mainly in rubles and yuan.
It is probably no coincidence that most of the US tariff pressure last year fell on some of the main BRICS members, such as Brazil, South Africa, India and, above all, China. Without forgetting that Iran is also part of the Brics, while Cuba, in 2024, obtained the status of partner country. Well, in recent weeks, both Tehran and Havana have been threatened by Trump with regime change. Venezuela itself, which is not officially part of the bloc, had, at the time of Maduro’s presidency, close ties with three Brics countries, such as China, Russia and Iran. The historical ties of the Chavista regime with the Castro regime (also in the oil sector) should not be forgotten. The concern, for Trump, is not so much that the dollar’s global dominance could suddenly end in the short term, but that the US currency could see its status progressively eroded.
And the greenback itself – in its financial, commercial and geopolitical value – perhaps constitutes the main challenge that the current American president finds himself facing. On the one hand, Trump aims to weaken it to increase exports and revive the domestic manufacturing sector. It is also from this perspective that the tensions between Trump and the president of the Fed, Jerome Powell, on interest rates should be read. On the other hand, for The Donald, duties and the revival of exports also have a meaning connected to national security. In fact, the occupant of the White House wants to reduce US dependence in strategic sectors on adversaries, starting with China. On the other hand, however, Trump aims to maintain the global dominance that the dollar enjoys by virtue of its reserve currency status. An objective which, according to some, would be in contradiction with the other, given that the reserve currency, by its nature, tends to strengthen.
It is therefore to try to resolve this issue that Trump is resorting to military and commercial pressure. The operation against Maduro, together with the threats to the Castros and the ayatollahs, fall within this strategy. The same goes for tariffs on India, China and Brazil. Military pressure and commercial pressure, in the eyes of the American president, constitute two sides of the same coin. The dollar’s global dominance is inextricably linked to the revival of Washington’s geopolitical influence. It is therefore (also) within this framework that the updated re-edition of the Monroe Doctrine, promoted by the second Trump administration, must be inserted.
Not only that. In 2024, the current chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, Pierre Yared, published an article in which he argued that the global dominance of the dollar was inextricably linked to US military power. “Military power is not just a supporting factor: it is a pillar of financial supremacy,” Yared wrote, and then continued: “Military strength increases investor confidence in a nation’s ability to service its debts, especially in times of crisis. In contrast, financial dominance allows a hegemon to finance its military at lower borrowing costs, strengthening its position globally.”
On the other hand, it is also clear to the Brics that the financial and military sides are related. In mid-January, South Africa hosted joint naval exercises between China, Russia and Iran. In short, the re-emergence of power politics also concerns the financial sphere.
And for Trump, this is a matter of the utmost urgency.
