The energy crisis caused by the Middle Eastern conflict has so far been mitigated by several factors. But the levee is about to collapse, as Trump considers a return to open war.
Although the energy crisis caused by the Middle Eastern conflict is being felt at the petrol pump, the catastrophic predictions at the beginning of the conflict, which spoke of an oil price close to 150 dollars or even higher, have not yet occurred.
The question therefore arises spontaneously whether the danger has definitively escaped thanks to correction measures implemented by several countriesor whether the latter are only palliatives, and the real resolution necessarily comes from a lasting end to the conflict.
What kept oil prices “low”.
Although with the rekindling of the Middle Eastern crisis it may seem misleading to talk about factors that have “contained” the price of oil, it must however be said that in the aftermath of the start of the war almost all of the most important credit institutions, such as JP Morgan for example, spoke of an oil price that would soon reach and surpass the 150 dollars a barrel.
This never happened for several reasons. The first is China’s large reduction in oil imports. Beijing, that is The world’s largest importer of crude oilreduced imports from over 11 million barrels per day in February 2026 to 6.4 million in June (Kpler estimates).
The choice was intentional. State-owned and independent refineries (which also process US-sanctioned oil) have suspended purchases spotconsumed floating and transit stocks and avoided making new purchases at increased prices.
The second reason has to do with the American Strategic Reserves (SPR). Shortly after the outbreak of the conflict, the American government authorized (in agreement with the International Energy Agency) the largest release of strategic reserves in US history.
About 172 million barrels of SPR are still being released, to at least partially offset the disrupted flow from Hormuz.
We must not forget the continuous optimistic messages via Trump’s social media, which during the crucial phases of the conflict contributed to creating the so-called “headline fatigue”, reducing the bullish bets on oil prices of large funds.
The latest factor was the partial reopening of the Strait between the end of June and the beginning of July, a reopening that allowed dozens of supertankers to leave the waters of the Persian Gulf.
American supplies are dwindling
There closure of Hormuz it has already caused oil prices to shoot up, which have exceeded 83 dollars for American WTI and 90 for Brent, but the situation could get worse.
According to data released the day before yesterday, the Spr in fact fell to 311.4 million barrelsthe lowest level since 1983, with a release of more than 104 million barrels since the conflict began.
The margin compared to the threshold of 252.4 million envisaged by law for ordinary withdrawals has thus narrowed to approximately 59 million barrels (although, it should be noted, that regulatory constraint only concerns “limited” withdrawals and not the current emergency release). At current rates, this limit would be reached around September.
The geological threshold is more insidious: several analysts place the operational limit between 150 and 200 million barrels, below which the salt caverns in which the oil is stored would no longer be able to guarantee the necessary pressure to extract crude oil at useful rates, with the risk of permanent damage to the cavities.
Escalation or new agreement?
The dilemma for Washington is now clear. Qatar, Egypt, Pakistan and other regional mediators they presented the United States and Iran with a ten-day truce proposal to save the June agreementwhile the Trump administration evaluates it but prepares in parallel for a possible failure of the negotiations, moving fighters and refueling planes to the region in view of a possible large-scale escalation.
Further complicating the scenario is the naval blockade declared by the Houthis against Saudi Arabiawhich threatens the ports on the Red Sea from which Riyadh exports around four million barrels a day, diverted there just after the closure of Hormuz.
If a large-scale resumption of bombing were combined with a real cut in Saudi exports, the White House would find itself forced to draw on the SPR even more just as the margin is dwindling. A combination that brings closer, rather than distances, a new (and more devastating) price shock.
