A 2018 security dossier described exactly the method the thieves used to target the Galerie d’Apollon. The document was never delivered to the new management and the recommendations remained a dead letter, paving the way for one of the most sensational thefts in French history.
A security document that has been gathering dust for years Louvre archives he had described with almost surgical precision the same method then used by the robbers to steal $101 million worth of jewels from the Galerie d’Apollon. A moving truck, a mechanized ladder positioned up to the second floor, direct access to the windows of the crown jewels: seven years before the robbery, that risk had already been put in black and white. Even accompanied by an explanatory drawing. Last October 19th, that script became reality. Four men in high visibility jackets park a van next to the museum, two take the lifting platform up to the Galerie d’Apollonthey break the glass with a grinder and take away the loot. A lightning-fast action, almost a demonstration of how unprepared the Louvre was, despite having received exactly that warning.
The report – commissioned in 2018 by the then director, Jean-Luc Martinezto the security division of Van Cleef & Arpels – had not been passed on to the new management. During a Senate hearing, the museum’s leaders admitted that the current director, Laurence des Cars, he didn’t even know that dossier existed. It only resurfaced after the theft, when the offices began rummaging through the archives looking for previous critical assessments. Martinezofficials explained, would keep a personal copy after leaving office in 2021. Other copies were dispersed among the archives of the Louvre and the Department of Decorative Arts. Neither the former director nor the jewelery house responded to requests for comment. Meanwhile, police have arrested four suspects linked to the robbery. But the jewels were not recovered and the possibility remains open that someone provided the thieves with confidential information.
After receiving the analysis of the jewelry house, the Louvre he had only strengthened the glass of the display cases. However, nothing had been done to protect access from the outside: vulnerable windows, few cameras, absence of infrared sensors. Measures which, according to the inspectors of Ministry of Culturewould have “in all probability prevented the robbery”. Pascal Mignerey, senior safety auditor, was peremptory: the guidelines were clear and the museum did not enforce them. A negligence that fits in in a broader framework of critical issues known for some time.
The parliamentary investigation highlighted a disconcerting detail: one of the internal cameras had filmed the arrival of the truck and the ascent of the ladder towards the Galerie d’Apollon. But that image never appeared on the screens of the monitoring centers. The Louvre did not even have automatic video analysis systems capable of reporting suspicious movements. In practice, the most famous museum in the world found itself blind just as the theft was taking place in broad daylight. Guy Tubiana, museum security consultant, did not mince words: «A series of malfunctions led us to catastrophe. I never thought the Louvre would be in such a state of dysfunction.” The existence of the ignored relationship, the absence of handovers between managements, the failure to apply the recommended measures and the structural fragility of the surveillance systems outline a picture that goes far beyond a simple robbery. It is the failure of a chain of command that was supposed to protect one of the most precious cultural heritages on the planet. Second Carlotta Predosin Art Security Manager : «A museum security system can never be considered static: it must function as a continuous process, updated and calibrated based on different risk scenarios. In this case, it is clear that the expertise of an expert has been underestimated. I also believe it is necessary to verify the possible leakage of sensitive information, an extremely serious fact that raises questions about confidentiality, the professionalism of the personnel involved and, perhaps, the lack of a technical figure truly responsible for security. Finally, the total lack of awareness on the part of the management regarding the existing documentation is striking. The director is the primary custodian of both the works and the safety of people: this also confirms the absence, within the museum, of a clear and structured point of reference for safety management. And while investigators search for those responsible for the hit, another, more disturbing question remains on the table: How many other vulnerabilities, known and forgotten, still sleep in the archives of the Louvre and in other French and even Italian museums?
