The Bundestag questions the risks of Chinese interference around CISPA, the strategic center for European cybersecurity: an affair that raises doubts about research, national security and technological sovereignty.
What until a few weeks ago appeared to be a normal story of international scientific cooperation has turned into one of the most delicate national security cases to emerge in Germany in recent years. At the center of the story is the CISPAthe prestigious Helmholtz Center for Cyber Security in Saarbrücken, considered one of the main global centers for research on cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. An investigation by Handelsblatt However, it raised disturbing questions about the relationships the institute has had for years with Chinese researchers and universities close to Beijing’s military apparatus. The revelations caused a political storm that has now reached Bundestag. Representatives of the CDU-CSU Union are calling for public funding to be suspended and to verify whether technologies and skills developed with German funds could have indirectly benefited China. The SPD also asked for a parliamentary investigation into the matter.
The strategic center of German cybersecurity CISPA it is not just any institute. It has been part of the network since 2019 Helmholtzthe most important German search system, and represents one of the European points of reference for cybersecurity, cryptography, artificial intelligence and data protection. In recent years the federal government and the Land of Saarland have invested hundreds of millions of euros in its development, considering it a strategic resource for Germany’s national security and technological competitiveness.
Espionage in Germany and the strategic role of CISPA in Saarbrücken
Precisely for this reason the accusations that emerged from journalistic investigations had a disruptive effect. Second Handelsblattnumerous projects and scientific publications would have been carried out together with researchers from Chinese universities considered close to the People’s Liberation Army or the Chinese defense sector. Some of the scholars involved collaborated with institutions that had come under scrutiny in the United States for their role in the technological and military development of the People’s Republic.
The investigation also alleges that several research groups at the center had an extremely high presence of Chinese researchers. In a laboratory dedicated to cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and data protection, 18 out of 19 members were reportedly of Chinese origin; another group would be composed exclusively of researchers from China. The central issue does not concern the nationality of the scholars, but the risk of involuntary transfer of sensitive knowledge. In fact, the technologies developed in the cyber sector often have dual-use applications, that is, they can be used in both the civil and military sectors.
The fear of technology transfer and dual-use threats
The issue fits into an already very tense context in relations between the West and China. In recent years, German intelligence services have repeatedly warned universities and research centers of the risks associated with technological espionage and the acquisition of know-how by foreign actors. As early as 2025, the federal government was developing new guidelines to limit economic and scientific intelligence activities attributed to Beijing. Particularly controversial is China’s 2017 regulation requiring citizens and organizations of the People’s Republic to cooperate with national security services when requested. An element that has fueled the concerns of Western agencies for years.
According to reconstructions published by the German press, the collaborations would have concerned highly sensitive sectors such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, analysis of computer vulnerabilities, protection of digital systems and advanced machine learning technologies. Areas that today represent one of the main terrains of strategic competition between China and the West.
The government’s countermeasures and director Michael Backes’ response
Faced with the controversy, the Federal Ministry of Research ordered an extraordinary verification. An independent inspector will have to ascertain whether security protocols have been violated, whether sensitive data or research results have been improperly shared and whether the control procedures adopted by the center are adequate for the strategic relevance of the activities carried out. Meanwhile the scientific director Michael Backes he would be temporarily relieved of his duties and projects involving Chinese partners were frozen pending verification.
The center strongly denies the accusations. In a series of official communications the CISPA stated that research safety is a top priority and that all international collaborations are subject to rigorous vetting procedures. The institute claims to have already introduced specific risk assessment mechanisms and to have appointed a dedicated research safety manager. According to the center’s management, the accusations risk compromising the freedom of research and international scientific cooperation, elements that have contributed to the success of German science in recent decades.
A case destined to be a lesson for the security of Europe
Beyond the individual responsibilities that will eventually be ascertained, the case CISPA represents a wake-up call for all of Europe. The story demonstrates how the geopolitical competition between China and the West is not only played out in markets or chancelleries, but also in university laboratories, research centers and scientific cooperation programs.
The question that Berlin and other European capitals are asking themselves today is as simple as it is delicate: to what extent is it possible to keep academic collaboration with China open without putting the strategic technological heritage of the West at risk? The debate has only just begun, but the consequences could redefine the entire relationship between scientific research and national security in Europe.
