It is not enough to have them, since the dissolution of the USSR NATO has lost the so-called nuclear strategy, that is, when and how European forces would use the atom. But it is the rules that give credibility to deterrence.
Since the invasion ofUkraine to date the Born has repeatedly questioned whether its nuclear arsenal, mainly consisting of American nuclear weapons present in Europeshould be modernized or strengthened. Excluding the Francewhich has its own atomic devices, from Kingdom United down no continental army possesses such weapons. And from the second election of Donald Trump at the House White the question also arises whether the States United can still be considered a reliable partner and what if Washington withdraw its nuclear umbrella over its allies.
Someone certainly elderly will remember that until 1988 exercises were carried out Wintex-Cimica name that meant “Winter Exercise with civil and military cooperation”, that is, a large-scale campaign that he simulated crisis and war scenarios with the aim of measuring the readiness, cooperation and response procedures of NATO nations and commands in the face of a crisis with NATO forces Covenant of Warsaw. And participants engaged in a simulation to assess how decision-making, communication and coordination would be managed during a large-scale conflict, including the possible use of nuclear weapons and interaction with civilian institutions for the protection of the non-combatant population.
Because we need a new shared nuclear strategy
It would be unthinkable to go back to defining a strategy on the use of nuclear weapons without resuming these practices. Finally, we need to put one on the diplomatic plate nuclear strategy credible and up-to-date. This is crucial since the effectiveness of deterrence nuclear power is not only based on the possession of weapons and available delivery systems, but also on the recognizable ability and willingness to use them in extreme cases. The Russian example is clear, especially when Putin And Lavrov remind the world that they would use theatomic if the very existence of the Russia. But achieving it requires making important strategic decisions, for example deciding which political and military principles should apply to the country’s possible use of nuclear weapons.Alliance. And also which lenses would be suitable for such use. And above all, what procedures should be in place to approve the use of nuclear bombs by the European NATO countries.
NATO responses to a hypothetical Russian nuclear attack
All this during the Cold War was precisely defined and was a process that included policy guidelines as well as procedures for consultation between the Allies and the coordination of enemy nuclear targets to be struck. But since the fall of Berlin Wall and from the dissolution ofUSSR all this was slowly forgotten until it was abolished in the hope that from then on Russia would be a stable and reliable partner nation. So today NATO no longer has a nuclear strategic consensus on how to take action Fly and how to strengthen the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. Most likely we will have to draw on what the military doctrine envisaged doing from 1960 al 1989but from a political and tactical point of view, current technology poses new challenges, such as IT security e cybernetics.
Much has also changed in the potential enemy: with the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact there is no longer the possibility of a land invasion by large armies, after all Russia is not the Soviet Union, but actions towards the North remain possible, i.e. towards the Baltic countries. However, among the hypotheses to be analysed, there is one tactical use of nuclear weapons on the part of Fly to slow down the deployment of troops such as the landing of any US battalions sent to help, but in this case theAlliance could not react with widespread nuclear attacks, but with targeted actions to demonstrate its willingness to defend itself and persuade the enemy to stop hostilities, but an action carried out on uninhabited areas would certainly not have credibility of determination. Easily there Born would hit Russia And Belarus after extensive consultations also with the Francebut certainly without waiting for the typical political delays of Brussels. Which would make you lose any war.
