NATO strengthens biodefense in the face of the risk of attacks with pathogens, secret programs and hybrid threats. From artificial intelligence to the global race for biotechnology, alarm about international security is growing.
The biological threats loom over NATO countries. In a context marked by the erosion of international rules, the Alliance considers the use of pathogens – bacteria, viruses or toxins – in military or terrorist attacks to be increasingly realistic. There biodefense is now considered central, like conventional, cyber and space capabilities, and Mark Rutte himself, Secretary General of NATO, has indicated the biotechnology as a strategic priority. In short, part of the “core defense spending” to which a good portion of the new economic commitment of the member countries will be dedicated, which have committed to increasing military spending up to 5 percent of their GDP by 2035, with a significant share allocated to expenses considered “central”.
Artificial intelligence and dual-use pathogens
Two factors are behind this reassessment of risk. First: theArtificial intelligence it reduces the technical difficulties in designing more effective biological agents and makes stabilization, control of dispersal and enhancement of virulence more easily achievable. Second: the recent modernization of some laboratories allows the creation of dual-use pathogens, i.e. for both civilian and military purposes. This makes it more difficult to distinguish between legitimate research activities and programs conducted as a cover for offensive purposes. In this context, even the unintentional proliferation of dangerous biological agents becomes a real possibility.
The programs of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea
To better understand the scope of these threats, it is necessary to refer to the Adherence to and compliance with arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments, a US report on arms control which shows that Russia is developing an offensive biological weapons program. The document states that Moscow allegedly failed to comply with its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention, maintaining knowledge and capabilities inherited from the Soviet Union and pursuing modernization activities that raise further concerns. Added to this are the programmatic ambitions of other countries, such as North Korea, which has a national offensive program dedicated to biological weapons, or China and Iran, which conduct biological research susceptible to military applications.
The risk of attacks and hybrid threats
Jessica Rogers, former advisor to the Pentagon for arms control treaties and now Senior fellow at the Janne E. Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons of the Council on Strategic Risks, explains that dangers are of three types: natural, accidental and deliberate. “My biggest concerns are possible biological weapons attacks, both from state and non-state actors,” he says.
Regarding possible scenarios, Rogers indicates large logistics hubs and aircraft carriers as sensitive targets, without ruling out attacks against civilians. According to the expert, Russia is showing interest in hybrid threatswhich combine conventional and unconventional attacks against critical infrastructure, while biological weapons could be employed alongside cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns to deny responsibility. Their impact on the operational readiness of forces would be enormous, making preparedness essential.
CBRN task forces and military exercises
Defense plans include a specialized incident task force Cbrn (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear), with reconnaissance, decontamination units, analytical laboratories and teams of experts ready to intervene in both the military and civil sectors. NATO also organizes multinational exercises such as “Steadfast Wolf 2025”, dedicated to biological warfare scenarios, and operations such as “Precise Response 2025”, which also saw the participation of Italian forces engaged in Canada with advanced detection and decontamination protocols.
A key part of preparedness involves the ability to detect a threat early. Monitoring urban wastewater, for example, allows pathogens to be identified before symptoms appear.
The scientific network and NATO laboratories
Member countries have key laboratories for detecting and counteracting pathogens and chemical weapons, such as the US Army’s Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, the German Army’s Institute of Microbiology, and the UK’s Defense Science and Technology Laboratory. Alongside these structures, a network of around 5 thousand researchers from universities, research centres, industries and military institutions coordinated by the Science and Technology Organization (Sto)the Alliance’s main scientific instrument.
Sto develops strategic knowledge useful for security, from biological protection technologies to artificial intelligence and cyber-security, while the program Science for Peace and Security supports civilian projects for the rapid detection of pathogens and the prevention of biological attacks.
Investments and the global race for biotechnology
The new threat will require huge investments. The Alliance established the Innovation Fund borna venture capital fund backed by 24 allies that will invest more than $1 billion in technologies to strengthen defenses, with a focus on biotech startups like Portal Biotech, a British company that uses protein sequencing to detect engineered threats.
The red line of Western democracies
Finally, a crucial question remains: does NATO have offensive biological weapons programs? Jessica Rogers rules out this hypothesis. “The Alliance does not even consider responding to biological weapons with more biological weapons,” he says, stressing that their use would violate the Biological Weapons Convention and represent a profoundly inhumane form of warfare.
There is therefore a threshold that Western democracies declare they do not want to cross. A border line which, in the new season of global tensions, marks the distance between increasingly opposing political systems and security models.
The opinions of Jessica Rogers, interviewed in this article, are solely her own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the US Department of Defense.
