Something significant is happening in the Russian region of Kursk. Western intelligence sources say so, and Kremlin intelligence sources confirm it, at the very least disoriented by the unexpected reversal of one of the “hot fronts” of the war, that of Kharkiv, which sees the fighting moving ever deeper into Russian territory. For three days, in fact, Kiev has surprisingly launched what is hour by hour taking on the shape of a vast and fully-fledged offensive, apparently successful.
Reports from the front lines say Ukrainian troops have penetrated more than 10km into Russian territory, making Kiev’s deepest cross-border advance since Moscow launched a large-scale invasion in February 2022. According to the Russian military, elite Ukrainian infantry units are now present in the Kursk region: at least a thousand men, supported by armored vehicles and perhaps also tanks with the cover of swarms of drones and missiles, have been advancing relentlessly since Tuesday morning. For the moment, there are no reports of the use of F-16s, the fighter planes that have just arrived in Ukraine directly from the hangars of Europe. Perhaps the jets will be used at a later time, to consolidate any positions that may have been conquered (for now, they are flying over the Kherson area).
Not only that. The Ukrainian army also hit the Russian airport of Lipetsk, more than 350 km from the border with Ukraine, with a night raid. Russian regional authorities have declared a state of emergency in the area, confirming that the strikes – probably guided missiles – have destroyed at least one “energy infrastructure facility”. In short, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says, “Moscow must feel the consequences of its invasion of Ukraine. (…) Russia has brought war to our land and must feel what it has done,” he said, without explicitly referring to the ongoing offensive. And it seems that he is succeeding in his goal, given that the Kremlin now perceives this initiative as an unacceptable humiliation. But this “satisfaction” certainly cannot be enough for Ukraine.
What is Kiev’s real goal with its move towards Kursk? What on Tuesday could have appeared only as a maneuver to ease tensions, as the days go by seems instead to be a carefully considered strategic choice, which aims to achieve at least two important objectives: the first, which has already been acquired by the Ukrainians, is the control station of the gas pipeline near the town of Sudzha (8 kilometers from the border), where about half of the Russian gas directed to Europe passes. But there is a second even more ambitious objective in the minds of the Ukrainian generals: the large nuclear power plant of Kursk, from the Soviet era. Gaining control of it would be – yes – an incredible setback for Putin’s Russia, the sign of an evident failure of the strategy of its commanders (moreover torpedoed one after the other in these 900 days of war). In short, Kiev is aiming to replicate a “Russian Zaporizhzhia”, the Ukrainian power plant, also dating back to the Soviet era, occupied by Russian soldiers as early as March 2022. Since then, Zaporizhzhia has been at the center of both Ukrainian concerns for the ongoing energy sabotage in the region, and international concerns due to a possible nuclear accident possibly caused by the fighting all around.
If Kiev’s troops succeed in their goal, the situation will become very difficult for Moscow, also and above all in view of a negotiation that – according to some diplomatic sources, not only Western ones – would be prepared by the end of 2024 or at the latest in the spring of 2025. In this sense, Zelensky’s move to sacrifice a significant number of troops and means (which Kiev has already been short of for months), would make sense. However, until the broader scenario of this incursion emerges, the true purpose of the Ukrainian armed forces remains a huge question mark. Despair or foresight? The answer to the true strategic objectives that Kiev has set itself can currently only be given by Oleksandr Syrskyi, the relatively new commander of the Ukrainian forces: suffering significant losses in battles of attrition on the front line is a Soviet mentality, and both Syrskyi and Russian commanders like Valery Gerasimov belong to that era. But are the new generations ready for the same sacrifice? We will see soon.
Certainly, after the failure of the much-heralded counteroffensive, for months Ukraine has been resisting as best it can the Russian advance, which is slowly but inexorably proceeding. (such as towards the Ukrainian military centers of Pokrovsk and Sloviansk), aware of the weakness of Kiev’s defenses, worn down by what had until now turned into a war of attrition. But the novelty of Kursk seems to want to call everything into question, because Moscow suddenly found itself having to deal with the most essential front line: its own border. It is true that Ukraine has long excelled in striking in a targeted manner – and with the help of the West – Russia’s internal infrastructure, destroying airstrips, military bases and oil terminals, and sinking one after another the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, in an attempt to cause as much damage as possible to Moscow’s war machine. This time, something different is happening: sending a (relatively) large ground force kilometers away from enemy territory, where Ukrainian supply lines are more difficult and the objectives are by definition more difficult to pursue, is a real gamble. And at the very least it must be worth it.
Certainly, the move heralds Kiev’s willingness to open a new phase of the conflict: not because Ukraine’s incursions into Russia are in any way new (for over a year, Ukrainian infiltrators and Russian rebels opposed to Putin have been striking Belgorod and the areas adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian border), but because in this case it is clearly the regular Ukrainian army launching a full-blown attack on Russia.
Why now? Perhaps because for the first time in two years, there is talk of a “real” peace conference organized by Ukraine itself and its allies, where Russia would be invited to participate to negotiate a definitive solution. When? Before Washington abandons its allies to their fate (a typical US attitude), or before a possible Trump presidency could change the cards on the table. If in fact the vice president and candidate president Kamala Harris could maintain the same firmness held by President Biden on Ukraine, it is good to remember that “Western foreign policy is a fickle and easily exhausted beast”, as suggested by US analyst Nick Paton Walsh. NATO’s persistent support for Ukraine, in fact, is an exception and a recent novelty. Zelesnky knows it, and so is Putin, who was quick to say that the incursion towards Kursk will push negotiations further away rather than bring them closer. Could it be true?
Certainly, if a negotiated solution is really less distant than in the past, Both sides in the war will be busy from now until that day to improve their position on the battlefield as much as possible, to be sure to have at least one or more winning cards in hand to exchange before sitting down at the table. Which inevitably preludes further clashes, reversals of front and bloodbaths.
